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I. INTRODUCTION
Another public relations icon aims at core civil liberties. Not coinci-
dentally, a rational American energy policy is also threatened. The
* A.B. Stanford University, 1984. J.D. University of California, Los Angeles, 1987, OR-
DER OF THE Cow. Associate, Public Utilities Group, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently an-
nounced that by 1990 its licensees authorized to run nuclear power reac-
tors must implement "fitness-for-duty" programs.1 Despite the com-
forting moniker, these programs do not mean jumping-jacks and stretch-
ing. Rather, "fitness-for-duty" means sweeping random drug tests of
possibly 200,000 law-abiding industry employees.2 The NRC's stated
"general objective" is "to provide reasonable assurance that nuclear
power plant personnel are reliable, trustworthy, and not under the influ-
ence of any substance, legal or illegal, or mentally or physically impaired
from any cause, which in any way adversely affects their ability to safely
and competently perform their duties." 3
The court system, which has arrogated for itself a huge chunk of
regulatory authority over American energy policy,4 will ultimately deter-
mine whether these fitness-for-duty regulations seek to achieve this objec-
tive rationally and constitutionally. It is no secret that many judges, even
those otherwise unfriendly to random testing, are fairly sanguine about
the constitutionality of testing these workers.5 Justice Scalia's views are
well-known,6 but other courts have freely echoed or alluded to the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing drug use by those "who have routine
access to dangerous nuclear power facilities."7 There is a serious risk,
1. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,468 (1989) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R.
pts. 2, 26).
2. Id. The NRC's own estimate is that the program will affect about 186,000 employees.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BACKFIT ANALYSIS FITNESS-FOR-DuTY 12-13
(1989) [hereinafter BACKFrr ANALYSIS]. This program will dwarf the civilian random testing
programs recently approved by the courts. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approximately 30,000 Department of Transporta-
tion employees subject to random testing); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884
F.2d 603, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (more than 9,000 employees), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864
(1990).
3. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,468.
4. See generally Huber, Electricity and the Environment in Search of Regulatory Author-
ity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1038-39 (1987) ("Individually, the sources of judicial review
may seem innocuous, but together they constitute a heavy gauge regulatory arsenal .... When
the agencies are at all hesitant or weak, the courts control the regulatory agenda."); see also R.
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983) (gen-
eral analysis of judicial role in management of Clean Air Act). Of course, the courts will also
be interested in the fitness-for-duty rules because of their constitutional implications. G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1986).
5. Justice Scalia, in his eloquent dissent in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab asserted that "the secured areas of a nuclear power plant" would be a workplace which
"could produce such catastrophic social harm that no risk whatever" is tolerable. 109 S. Ct.
1384, 1400 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This statement is a stunning blow to those hoping
for meaningful judicial review of the fitness-for-duty rules.
6. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
7. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1419 (1989); see also
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therefore, that the most massive civilian drug-testing dragnet in the his-
tory of the United States will be enacted and followed only by fluffy judi-
cial review.8 This Article calls attention to the constitutional issues
implicated by the fitness-for-duty program.
Historical precedent augurs that the opponents of the fitness-for-
duty regulations will focus on the extent to which the regulation's burden
on the tested individuals constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.9
In other words, the sharpest critique will come from the individual rights
perspective associated politically with the left-libertarian tradition. 10 The
left-libertarians will virtually concede that the fitness-for-duty regula-
tions go to a compelling state interest, amorphously called "public
safety," but will insist that the fitness-for-duty program is unduly inva-
sive. This approach will not be effective since the early skirmishes won
by left-libertarian litigants have been swamped more recently.11
Although a few widely scattered judicial enclaves might still emphasize
the invasiveness of drug testing (particularly random testing), 12 recent
Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[a]
radiological release could seriously injure the public and the plant employees").
8. The Supreme Court, however, offers some hope. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Scalia
and Stevens have expressed at least conditional opposition to drug testing. See infra notes 173-
81 and 203-12 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist has been a very strong propo-
nent of nuclear power, perhaps offering the opportunity for a fifth vote. See, e.g., Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 95 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
9. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
10. See infra notes 88-105 and 111-25 and accompanying text. One of the cleanest pro-
nouncements from the bench of core left-libertarian rights-based philosophy is found in Panora
v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989). The dissent quoted former Justice Jackson as
follows:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of working
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they do
not depend on the outcome of elections.
Id. at 370 (Lavorato, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
11. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (allowing drug testing of railroad employees); Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 (suggesting huge segments of government workforce eventually could
be subject to testing).
12. See, eg., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (striking
down Justice Department regulations mandating random drug testing for all department crim-
inal case prosecutors and employees with access to grand jury proceedings, opinion structured
to substantially emphasize individual interests over government interests); Hartness v. Bush,
712 F. Supp. 986, 993 (1989) (striking federal government testing of certain employees, court
was "not persuaded.., that the government... has a compelling interest in the testing of the
several hundred employees.., that justifies violation of their undisputed expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to their elimination functions.").
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decisions demote this approach to a curious anachronism. 13
A more complete analysis may be gained by shifting the focus to
more careful scrutiny of the government interest side of the balance. It is
the government's asserted interest which may channel both left-liberta-
rian drug testing opponents, and those concerned with preserving the
nuclear, generation option, into a successful coordinated attack. Before
addressing legal strategies, this Article reviews the events and process by
which America's war on drugs (inname, if not always in fact) and war
on the atom (in fact, if not always in::name) has put hundreds of
thousands of innocent industry employees and an important part of a
balanced national energy program on the regulatory chopping block.
"A. The Nuclear Industry
The nuclear energy.inidustry is tWisting-in the breeze, seeking to re-
visit the expansion mode of the 1960s, even though pummelled by forces
beyond its control. 4 Popular support for nuclear energy has dwindled
13. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 ("To the extent transportation and like restric-
tions are necessary to procure the requisite blood, breath, and urine samples for testing, this
interference alone is minimal given the employment context in which it takes place."); Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 ("[E]mployees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity.").
14. See generally J. MORONE & E. WOODHOUSE, THE DEMISE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:
LESSONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 1 (1989) ("[C]ivilian nuclear power
in the United States has brought mainly grief: widespread fear, huge cost overruns, utility
companies stuck with partly completed reactors, and the nuclear industry in disarray....
[T]he image of nuclear power is in tatters."); Graham, Nuclear Power Assembly, 32 NUCLEAR
NEWS, July 1989, at 98 (senior utility executive stated that new plants "cannot be expected
soon because there is not adequate public and political support"); Green, Nuclear Gasification
of Coal for Control of Carbon Dioxide Emission, 122 PUn. UTIL. FORT. 13, 14 (1988) ("The
substitution of nuclear power for coal-based, central station power is an option now subject to
a defacto moratorium... "); Scheibla, Going Fission, BARRON'S, Feb. 20, 1989, at 14, col. 3
(President Bush's plans to'revive nuclear industry "look like sheer fantasy"); Sperber, Ryan &
Jordan, Environmental Issues Said Bringing Public to Look Anew at Nuclear, 30 NUCLEONICS
WEEK, Feb. 9, 1989, at 11 ("[For the time being, [nuclear is] like a ship in irons.").
With the exception of France, most Western industrial nations with nuclear programs are
similarly situated. See, eg., O'Dwyer, Finnish Prime Minister Backs Fifth Nuclear Plant, 30
NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 25, 1989, at 3 (58% of Finnish people oppose new nuclear power);
Nuclear Experts Alarmed by Dwindling Public Acceptance, 28 NUCLEONICS WEEK, Apr. 21,
1988, at 7 (discussing flaring of anti-nuclear movement in Japan and South Korea); Closure of
Two Units Seen for 1995, 1996, 5 NUCLEAR NEWS, Apr. 1, 1988, at 70 (Swedish government
announces nuclear phase-out). Incredibly, Yugoslavia has gone so far as to make it a criminal
offense to plan new nuclear facilities! Stanic, Nuclear Planning Ban Said to End Nuclear Op-
tion for Yugoslavia, 30 NUCLEONICS WEEK, July 13, 1989, at 3. England joined the growing
list when the Thatcher government surrendered to demands that the British nuclear expansion
plan be terminated. Britain Yanks Nuclear Plants From Its Electricity Privatization Program,
Energy Daily, Nov. 14, 1989,,at 1, col. 1.
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slowly but steadily since around 1970,15 and the industry, whether be-
cause of inherent ambivalence within utilities operating both nuclear and
fossil-fuel plants,16 ineffective public relations, or some other cause, has
apparently not hit bottom. The last uncancelled order for a new plant
came more than a decade ago, 7 and no new orders are on the horizon.
"Increasingly, people on both sides [of the nuclear debate] are suggesting
that unless a comeback is started soon, the nuclear power industry will
degenerate to the point of no return.""8
Public opposition has pressured Congress and the NRC into an al-
15. For historical measurement and insightful analysis of the troubled history of popular
opinion of nuclear energy in America, see J. MoRoNE & E. WOODHOUSE, supra note 14, at 11,
93-96, 100-01, 120, 134. The public has reacted negatively to nuclear energy industry because:
(1) risks are "unfamiliar," (2) "involuntary," (3) public lacks "personal control," (4) risks are
"perceived" to outweigh benefits and (5) the "potential for catastrophe" as opposed to smaller,
more incremental losses. Id. at 94. See also B. COHEN, BEFORE IT'S Too LATE 1-10, 255-66
(1983) (tracing rise in public opposition to American nuclear power program from 20% in
1956, to 33% in 1977 (before Three Mile Island incident) and to 56% in 1979 (following Three
Mile Island)); Blake, SMUD Halts Operation After Referendum Loss, 32 NUCLEAR NEWS,
July 1989, at 30 (describing June 6, 1989 vote in Sacramento, California, by 53-47% margin, to
close a working nuclear power plant (Rancho Seco); first such vote ever in United States).
Opposition to nuclear power has been growing steadily:
The Harris Poll began surveying... in March 1975, when it found public opinion
favored building more nuclear plants by a solid 63% to 19% margin... In April
1979... the same poll found only 44% in favor of more nuclear power, 43% against
... Since then, opposition has mounted steadily, reading a high in December 1988,
with 65% against, 30% in favor...
Three Mile Island's Legacy of Fear and Doubt, U.P.I., Domestic News, Mar. 24, 1989 (wire
service, BC Cycle).
16. Investor-owned public utilities executives recently have shown not only impressive
commitment to nuclear, but also significant cohesiveness on two major regulatory issues.
First, the industry, has supported legislative efforts spearheaded by Representative Don Ritter
(R-Pa.) to block the decommissioning of the Shoreham nuclear power facility. Maize, Torn
Apart: Nuclear Group Finds Itself Backing Away From Save Shoreham Move, Energy Daily,
Aug. 22, 1989, at I, col. 1. Although the proposed legislation would cut off NRC funding to
transfer the operating license from Long Island Lighting Company (the public utility owner of
Shoreham) which may bankrupt the utility, the industry has noietheless coalesced behind the
bill. Id. at 1, col. 2. The nuclear industry also showed unusual cohesiveness in recent opposi-
tion to sweeping new NRC maintenance regulations, despite the financial interests of many
nuclear utilities to accede to the NRC. See Maize, NRCs Carr to Push Maintenance, Energy
Daily, Aug. 15, 1989, at I, col. 1.
17. Embattled Nuclear Plant Gets Go-Ahead, Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1990, § 1, at 3,
col. 5. "The Seabrook construction period was marked by a sharp decline in public and inves-
tor support for nuclear power. According to Public Citizen, a private advocacy group that
opposes nuclear power, Ill U.S. reactor orders were canceled and eleven operating plants
were retired during Seabrook's construction. The NRC's Carr noted that there are no new
applications for nuclear power plants before the commission." Id
18. Bums, Critics, Supporters of Nuclear Power See It Nearing a Point of No Return, L.A.
Times, Apr. 2, 1989, Pt. I, at 14, col. 1. ("Suppliers of nuclear plant components already are
dropping out of the business and the pool of university-trained nuclear engineers is
shrinking.").
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most irreversible political dialectic. The NRC raises the costs of nuclear
power, by requiring additional engineered safety features, in order to sat-
isfy political opponents who argue that plants are "unsafe," or at least
not safe enough." These additional regulations dramatically escalate
costs, which are passed on to rate payers. This further reduces political
support for nuclear energy by painting the utilities that purchased nu-
clear plants as imprudent for either failing to choose fossil-fired plants, or
to do more to encourage conservation. To the consumer, nuclear ap-
pears to be "priced out of the market." The high price, however, is re-
lated directly to the questionable safety expenses.20 The reduced public
support prompts more regulation, and so on.21
Despite the unfavorable political dialectic, the industry has refused
to die.22 Ironically, the very environmental concerns which two decades
ago helped trigger the industry's slide may now provide a significant
boost, as fears of environmental catastrophe in the form of global warm-
ing and acid rain push the nuclear radiation threat out of the forefront of
the environmental agenda.23 Potential electricity shortages are also a ris-
19. NRC backfitting regulations require extraordinary expenditures to improve plant
safety. "'Backfitting' refers to the imposition of new or modified safety requirements on nu-
clear power plants previously licensed for construction or operation." Union of Concerned
Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 880 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20. Management undeniably takes a slice of the blame for the relatively high operations
and maintenance costs at nuclear reactors. These costs rose 22% in 1988 alone. See O&M
Costs Continue to Bedevil Nuclear Power, Energy Daily, Sept. 21, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
21. Political problems have proved costly to many public utilities. See J. MORONE & E.
WOODHOUSE, AVERTING CATASTROPHE 47 (1984) ("This open-ended regulatory process may
or may not produce added safety gains, but it has proven extraordinarily costly to the nuclear
industry.").
22. One commentator has noted:
By year-end [1988], there was enough interest in a renewed nuclear energy industry
that the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness staged the first open-to-the-public Nu-
clear Energy Forum in Los Angeles .... Hope springs eternal in the nuclear industry
.... The nuclear industry hopes "nouvelle nukes," with their separation of nuclear
and non-nuclear (steam) plant cooling systems, which rely on gravity instead of...
pumps, and factory-built quality control will win the confidence of utility
stockholders.
Savage, The Second Coming of Nuclear Power, Bus. & Soc'y Rv. 60 (Winter 1988).
See also Egan, Could Interstate Generating Companies Help Revive Nuclear?, Energy
Daily, Aug. 9, 1989 at 2, col. 1 ("Regional generating companies are also a sine qua non for the
revival of nuclear power .... (The industry is going to have to get together and have some
regional generating companies which have the capacity to built [sic] several reactors and insti-
tute a training program)"); Zengerle, Westinghouse Sees Light at End of Tunnel for Nuclear
Power, Reuters Bus. Rep., May 22, 1989 (wire service, BC Cycle) (noting that greenhouse
effect may force industrial nations to give up coal; citing "demand for electricity, simpler li-
censing procedures, new plant designs and improved waste management" as likely to "gener-
ate demand for new plants by the mid-1990s").
23. See Seneviratne, IAEA Reply to Brundtland Report: Nuclear Safe, Clean, and Needed,
30 NUCLEONICS WEEK, Apr. 27, 1989, at 14 (arguing for "environmental advantages of nu-
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ing fear.24 Although some commentators have dismissed such rationales
for industry revival as a "sheer fantasy,"'25 the nuclear option has many
environmentalists thinking twice:
Why is Morris Udall, known as the House's leading environ-
mentalist, willing to consider nuclear power? "I used to be
concerned about the environmental effects of nuclear energy.
But when I look at the effects of acid rain, I think nuclear de-
serves a second look," he says. "The hard fact is that we're
going to need a considerably larger chunk of energy in the
Nineties."
26
Many of the industry's leading players are organizing for a new
push and there are signs that the public may be somewhat more receptive
than it has been in the recent past.
clear power" and that "use of nuclear power has led to reductions in SO, and NO. emissions");
Kuch, A Second Nuclear Era, 116 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 16-15 (1985) ("To demonstrate the
effectiveness of nuclear power in eliminating C02 emissions that could lead to the greenhouse
effect, France can be cited ... [It] generates almost 60 percent of its electrical energy by
nuclear power... [and] between 1979 and 1983, a reduction in [C02 emissions] of 20 percent
was obtained."); see generally B. COHEN, supra note 15, at 64-71, 97-101, 120-22, 135-37, 235-
37, 261-62 (noting critical environmental deficiencies in coal burning); Huber, supra note 4, at
1028-35 (fascinating and detailed analysis of environmental risks associated with various en-
ergy-producing technologies); Sperber, Ryan & Jordan, supra note 14, at 11 ("You don't need
a nuclear option as long as you're willing to use the atmosphere as a sewer.").
24. See McCaughey, Generating Shortages Threaten National Security, Warns Watkins,
Energy Daily, Oct. 17, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
25. Scheibla, supra note 14, at 14.
26. Id. at 15.
27. A national survey conducted in May, 1988, with a margin of error of plus or minus
2.5%, found that: (1) nuclear energy was named as our primary source of energy ten years
from now by 36% of the respondents-nearly three-to-one over solar, the closest competitor;
(2) nuclear was found most likely to "benefit the nation" in the years ahead by 38% of the
respondents, compared to 37% of the respondents who listed solar; (3) 55% said nuclear will
be very important in the coming years, up 20 points in the last three years; and (4) 76% said
the need for nuclear energy will increase in the years ahead. Nuclear Group News, June 29,
1988, at 1, col. 4; see also Reppert, Industry Ad Campaign Seeks to Regain Support for Nuclear
Power, A.P., Sept. 19, 1988 (wire service, P.M. Cycle) (describing one million dollar television
and print advertising campaign underway on behalf of nuclear by United States Council for
Energy Awareness); Three Mile Island's Legacy of Fear and Doubt, U.P.I., Domestic News,
Mar. 24, 1989 (wire service, BC Cycle) ("Recent industry-commissioned polls indicate a
grudging acceptance among Americans that nuclear power may be necessary someday ....").
One effort to improve the public's understanding of the nuclear production of electricity has
gone so far as to market a $275,000 see-through plant model. See 30 NUCLEONICS WEEK, July
6, 1989, at 12. Pockets of strong support for nuclear persevere. See, e.g., Savage, supra note
22, at 62 (noting that "[flor the third time [in the 1980s]" Maine residents rejected closing
Maine Yankee nuclear power plant) (quoting PUBLIC CITIZEN, Jan./Feb. 1988).
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B. The Nuclear Industry Meets the War on Drugs
Following the 1979 incident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania,28
the NRC enacted an unbroken stream of backfitting regulations.29 The
post-Three Mile Island backfits began the process of shifting regulatory
focus from the traditional hardware concerns to the human elements.30
Over the same ten years, the nation has taken increasingly tenacious
steps to combat drug use in the public work force.3" Employees of the
federal government or of federally regulated industries, particularly em-
ployees in safety-sensitive positions, are now subject to a variety of drug-
testing programs.32 Not surprisingly, the political dialectic of the nuclear
industry eventually pushed the NRC to "backfit" another safety feature
of the nuclear power plants-the people who work in and operate
them.33 Perhaps even less surprising, given the zealous public demands
for action on "the drug front ' 34 and the equally intense public opposition
to nuclear power, nuclear plant employees were targeted for the most
punishing drug testing program in the history of civilian America.35
28. In March 1979, mechanical and operator error combined to cause the release of nu-
clear fission products into the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island. J. MORONE & E. WOOD-
HOUSE, supra note 14, at 48-50. Although the incident has been considered the "worst
mishap" in United States nuclear history, some commentators believe the levels of radioactiv-
ity released will have "negligible effect" on the physical health of the population. Id. at 51.
29. The NRC has ordered repeated modifications of design requirements, both for reactors
under construction and for operating nuclear plants. Id. at 47.
30. See J. MORONE & E. WOODHOUSE, supra note 14, at 53 (following Three Mile Island,
operators began receiving regulatory attention, but "prior to the... [Three Mile Island] acci-
dent, regulators had directed most attention to design errors rather than operator errors").
31. Perhaps former President Reagan's September 15, 1986, Executive Order, mandating
the establishment of drug-testing programs for federal employees in "sensitive" positions was
the most recent declaration of the nation's "war on drugs." See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3
C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 app. at 909-11 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (railroad em-
ployees); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (Customs
Service employees); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Justice Depart-
ment); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989)
(Education Department); Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1989) (miscellaneous
federal employees); Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, No. 88-3429, 89-1519
(D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1989) (LEXIS-15409, Genfed library, Dist file) (private employees on com-
mercial vessels subject to Coast Guard regulations).
33. See infra note 333.
34. Given that recent popular surveys show many Americans would surrender most of
their own constitutional freedoms to fight the drug war, it should shock no one that the major-
ity would eviscerate the freedoms of the employees of a highly unpopular industry. See Wash.
Post, Sept. 8, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4.
35. In fact, when such an unpopular minority is singled out for adverse treatment of any
type, reviewing courts ought to prick up their ears. When adverse treatment of minorities
occurs, for instance, during the hysteria and panic often associated with war time, courts may
later regret any lack of vigilance in protecting the minority caught in the cross-fire. See Kore-
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Apparently in response to anecdotal evidence of some drug arrests
and terminations of licensee employees for drug activity,36 the NRC first
issued a proposed rule in 1982 calling for utilities to adopt fitness-for-
duty programs.37 The NRC hastily slapped together its proposed regula-
tion just five months after receiving the reports of drug use.38 The pro-
posed rule was "broadly worded" to permit licensees "to develop
procedures which take into account not only fairness... but also any
conditions or circumstances unique" to the licensees.3 9 Nuclear utilities
took the NRC at its word on the last point, and developed fitness-for-
duty programs varying significantly in scope and intensity.4 The leading
industry groups promulgated their own guidelines for adequate fitness-
for-duty programs. 1
Meanwhile, the NRC continued to monitor the level of drug activity
at nuclear power stations.42 In July, 1984, the NRC approved publica-
tion of a final rule that would require utilities to implement fitness-for-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II).
36. Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,980 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R pt. 50) (proposed Aug. 5, 1982, withdrawn Aug. 4, 1986).
37. See id. at 33,980 (licensees must develop programs to protect the public health and
safety, but may tailor procedures to "take into consideration not only fairness to and due
process for its employees, but also any conditions or circumstances unique to its facility"); see
also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing
history of NRC's efforts to implement fitness-for-duty programs). J. MORONE & E. WOOD-
HOUSE, supra note 14, at 53 ("[P]rior to the ... [Three Mile Island] accident regulators had
directed most attention to design errors rather than operator errors").
38. Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,980.
39. Id.
40. Apparently, the explanation for the variance in licensee testing programs lies in local
labor conditions, particularly the presence or absence of labor unions. See U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, FITNESS-FOR-DUTY IN THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY 3-12,
3-13 (1989) [hereinafter NUREG-1354]. Another significant explanation is that certain licen-
sees perceive a greater fitness threat posed at their plants by drugs. Id. The NRC's fitness-for-
duty rule ultimately attempted to satisfy these same concerns in two ways: It first allowed
licensees to establish "tougher" standards (more drugs tested, lower cut-off levels, etc.) than
the NRC fitness-for-duty rule; and secondly, it affirmed that existing rules allow a licensee to
"grant exemptions to provisions of the rule which it determines are necessary and authorized
by law." Id. at 3-13.
41. See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., EEI GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE DRUG AND ALCOHOL/
FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY DEVELOPMENT (1987).
42. See Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 51 Fed.
Reg. 27,872, 27,921 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (withdrawn Aug. 4, 1986) ("It remains
the continuing responsibility of the NRC to independently evaluate applicant development and
licensee implementation of fitness for duty programs to ensure that desired results are
achieved.").
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duty rules.43 Several months later, the NRC reconsidered its position, in
the face of rapid industry movement towards encouraging the enactment
of voluntary programs, and under pressure to give such programs the
reasonable breathing space necessary to work.
44
Then, on August 4, 1986, the NRC actually withdrew the proposed
1982 fitness-for-duty rule, substituting a hortatory policy statement
which read:
The Commission's decision [to withdraw the proposed rule] is
intended to recognize and further encourage the initiatives con-
cerning fitness for duty being taken by the nuclear power indus-
try, the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources
Committee [NUMARC], and by the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations [INPO]. The Commission will exercise this
deference as long as the industry programs produce the desired
results.45
However, the NRC was out of step with the march of political
events in Washington, as just a few weeks later and amidst growing pub-
lic alarm, President Reagan issued an Executive Order calling for
mandatory drug tests of federal employees in "sensitive positions.
46
The NRC reversed field again on September 22, 1988, pulling itself in
line with the Washington trend and signaling the end of its previously
announced "deference" to the individual concerns of its licensees.47 The
NRC now proposed quasi-military generic fitness-for-duty rules, 48 noting
that, although the nuclear power industry had made "significant efforts
... in achieving an environment... free of the effects of alcohol and
drugs," rulemaking was needed to achieve "uniformity. '49 The NRC's
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking laid out the rejected alternative options
to the testing program selected, 0 and carefully presented scientific sup-
43. Personnel With Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 51 Fed.
Reg. 27,873.
44. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDUM
(1984).
45. Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 51 Fed. Reg.
27,872.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,564 § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 224, 226 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
app. at 909, 910 (1988).
47. Fitness-for-Duty Program, 53 Fed. Reg. 36,795, 36,796 (1988) (to be codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 26).
48. Id. at 36,796.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 36,804-08 (alternatives discussed included blood plasma testing, hair and speech
analysis).
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port for the proposed rule.51 The public, workers and their unions, licen-
sees, and industry groups then commented on the proposed fitness-for-
duty rules. 2 The final fitness-for-duty rules constitute the most rigorous
substance testing program in the federal government, outside of the
armed services.5
1. The scope of the fitness-for-duty rules
All persons, including both licensee employees and employees of
vendors hired by the licensees,54 with unescorted access to "protected
areas" of a plant either under construction or in operation, are covered
by the rules.5 The "protected area"56 of the nuclear power plant essen-
tially includes most areas within the perimeter gates of a plant. 7 Thus,
51. Id. at 36,812-14.
52. See NUREG-1354, supra note 40, at iii (presenting detailed summary of "the com-
ments received on the proposed rule and... the staff resolutions of the issues raised by the
comment"). The comments clearly reveal that a tripolar political arrangement in the regula-
tory process spawned the final version of the fitness-for-duty rules. Union and industry em-
ployee commentators largely, though not unanimously, opposed random drug testing. Id. at 3-
1 to 3-3 ("current fitness-for-duty programs provide effective and adequate assurances that
industry workers operate in a substance-free environment"). Id. at 3-3.
While most unions stated strong opposition, the utility licensees' position was less pellu-
cid. Id. at 3-12, 3-13. Nuclear utilities hotly contested surrendering additional management
discretion over their plants to the NRC, and therefore opposed any drug testing regime which
did not focus control of the program at the licensee's headquarters. Id. However, as long as
the utilities retained substantial authority over the program, most management supported a
rather broad concept of the goals of fitness-for-duty (e.g., ensuring "general trustworthiness,"
rather than simply avoiding "impairment"). Id. at 3-7, 6-1. Licensees, of course, concurrently
resisted the rules' implicit suggestion that existing plants were not safe enough. Id. at 3-4.
Finally, nuclear utilities were concerned about bearing the cost of the program. Id. at 13-1, 17-
3, 19-1. Utility opposition to the rules, to the extent it exists, derives from concerns for man-
agement power, costs and public perception, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, concern for
workers' constitutional interests.
The third leg of the stool would be the NRC. Attempting to represent the public largely
hostile to nuclear technology, the NRC expressed no lack of conviction that the proposed
program was the minimum necessary to serve the public interest. Id. at 3-I.
53. For a discussion of drug testing in the armed services, see United States v. Scholz, 19
M.J. 837 (1984) (upholding sweeping random testing scheme in military environment) and
United States v. Nand, 17 M.J. 936 (1984) (same).
54. See United States v. Scholz, 19 M.J. 837 (1984); United States v. Nand, 17 M.J. 936
(1984).
55. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,471.
56. Id. at 24,495.
57. Id. at 24,471. A variety of employee classifications have unescorted access to the "pro-
tected area" of a plant, including "vendors, secretaries, clerks, and some engineering and man-
agement personnel." Id. The NRC staff ultimately included all workers in the testing
program because "[a]ll such workers have the ability to carry in and distribute impairing sub-
stances. All such workers can engage in deliberate or accidental actions that can lead to chal-
lenges to safety systems or interfere with the ability of other workers to safely operate and
maintain the plant." Id.
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custodians and file clerks, as well as control room operators and security
guards, are included in the fitness-for-duty program.58 A few other re-
mote personnel classifications are also included. 9
2. Fitness-for-duty testing procedures
Five events may trigger a fitness-for-duty test: (1) initial hire or
transfer to the power block; (2) random selection; (3) certain accidents;
(4) supervisor suspicion; and (5) a previous positive test.60 Random test-
ing will be conducted at an annual rate of 100% of the work force, "ad-
ministered on a nominal weekly frequency and at various times during
the day."' 61 The circumstances listed in categories (3) and (4) may be
deemed present: (a) where observed behavior indicates substance abuse;
(b) after accidents involving injury or radiation release; (c) after safety
degradation, if a "reasonable suspicion that the worker's behavior con-
tributed to the event" exists; or (d) based on "credible information.
62
Licensees must test for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines,
phencyclidine (PCP), and alcohol. 63 The NRC may add additional sub-
stances to the test list "in response to industry experience," and licensees
may establish more stringent cut-off levels."
The NRC largely adopted the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) Guidelines 65 for the collection, security, and testing of
specimens for drugs and alcohol.6 6 Under the HHS guidelines, the urine
collection site must be secured and the tested employees must identify
themselves to an on-site observer.67 The tested employee removes their
outer garments, signs a consent form, and lists all medications taken in
58. Id.
59. Personnel without unescorted access to protected areas but who are required to re-
spond to the licensee's Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility during
certain events are included "because of the potential impact on public health and safety that
could arise from human failure on their part." Id.
60. Id. at 24,497.
61. Id. Typically, a 100% rate means that an employee will be tested once per year, but
that some will be tested two or three times, and others not at all. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 24,500.
64. Id. at 24,504.
65. Id. at 24,475.
66. The Health and Human Services Guidelines are seen as providing stringent protection
of subjects in these sensitive areas of concern and are currently in use in many federal work-
places for testing of federal employees. See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney,
884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
67. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,501-02.
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the past thirty days.68 The on-site observer remains in the room, but the
tested employee "may provide his or her urine specimen in the privacy of
a stall or otherwise partitioned area that allows for individual privacy."'6 9
The licensee transports the sample to either the licensee's own test-
ing facility or, if the licensee has no facility, to a certified testing lab,
where strict chain-of-custody reporting procedures must be in place.70
Both urine and breath samples are tested;71 urine tests employ a stan-
dard, commercially approved immunoassay.72 If either the blood or
breath test is positive, a second and conclusory test follows using the
expensive, but highly reliable gas chromatography procedure.73
3. The post-sampling fitness-for-duty procedures
Under the rules, positive results are initially directed to the licen-
see's Medical Review Officer.7 4 The rules require that a Medical Review
Officer "be a licensed physician with knowledge of substance abuse disor-
ders and may be a licensee or contract employee."75 The Medical Re-
view Officer has the authority to refuse verification of the results if, in the
Medical Review Officer's opinion, sufficient reasons exist to be skeptical
of their validity.76 An initial positive result may not be reported to the
utility prior to a positive confirmatory test.7 7
If the Medical Review Officer verifies the positive result, he shall
"notify the applicable employee assistance program and the licensee's
management official empowered to recommend or take administrative
action (or the official's designated agent). '78 At a minimum, licensees
must remove employees who test positive from activities within the scope
of the fitness-for-duty rules, for two weeks or until the EAP and manage-
ment certifies the individual's fitness to adequately perform activities
68. Id. at 24,502.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 24,501-04.
71. Id. at 24,504.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 24,507 ("A positive test result does not automatically identify a nuclear power
plant worker as having used substances in violation of the NRC's regulations or the licensee's
company policies. An individual with a detailed knowledge of possible alternate medical ex-
planations is essential to the review of results.").
75. Id. at 24,500, 24,507.
76. Id. at 24,507. Indeed, if the Medical Review Officer "determines that there is a legiti-
mate medical explanation for the positive test result and that use of the substance identified...
does not reflect a lack of reliability.., the [Medical Review Officer] shall report the test result
to the licensee as negative." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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within the scope of the fitness-for-duty rules, whichever is later.79
The fitness-for-duty rules do not bar the utility from firing the tested
individual.80 Subsequent positive tests trigger a three-year suspension
from activity in protected areas." Thereafter, the individual undergoes
follow-up testing at least once per month for four months, and then at
least once every three months until three years have passed since the last
positive test.82 Further involvement with drugs, whether or not detected
by the fitness-for-duty program, translates into a lifetime ban from unes-
corted access to protected areas of any nuclear power plant.
8 3
Information concerning test results is, in theory, closely held,
although the confidentiality provisions of the rules ultimately may be
swallowed by the myriad exceptions. Medical Review Officers, other
licensees making employment decisions, and NRC officials, but only with
the tested employee's consent, and persons acting under the color of
court authority (including law enforcement officials) all have access to
the test results.84 The rules specifically declare that "[t]he NRC has de-
cided to retain the provision providing access to appropriate law enforce-
ment officials ....85
C. The Dual Threat of the Fitness-for-Duty Rules and the Need for
Real Judicial Scrutiny
This Article illustrates the declining support for nuclear power,
86
while the national "war on drugs" fever boils. The nuclear industry and
its employees are caught in the middle. This Article shows that, given
the philosophical and jurisprudential underpinnings of fourth amend-
ment law, the fitness-for-duty rules present a difficult constitutional case.
This is particularly so in light of the way humans are involved in the
nuclear generation process. Thus, without real judicial scrutiny of the
fitness-for-duty regulations, substantial constitutional rights may simply
and quietly expire. An efficient and balanced American energy plan is
also threatened by the same currents. But the next step towards this
79. Id. at 24,476-77.
80. Id. at 24,476 ("This section further specifies that the rule does not prohibit the licensee
from taking more stringent actions.").
81. Id. at 24,477. All licensees are required to adopt appeal procedures, but management
may decide the appeal if it does so "impartially." Id.
82. Id. at 24,477 ("the higher testing rate during the first four months would provide the
worker with an increased incentive to remain abstinent").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 24,481-82.
85. Id. at 24,482.
86. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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conclusion is examination of the philosophical traditions which place the
parameters on any legitimate governmental interference with its
constituents.
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DRUG-TESTING
JURISPRUDENCE
If a court that follows the traditional philosophies of liberal, demo-
cratic jurisprudence could conclude that the NRC fitness-for-duty rules
test the limits of permissible interference with individual privacy, an ex-
amination of the dominant philosophies is in order. Two competing the-
ories of fourth amendment jurisprudence relate to employee drug testing.
Most contemporary philosophers would label these traditions "rights
based" (or "neo-Kantian"), and "utilitarian." s Both theories seek to de-
fine the proper relationship between society and individual; government
and governed. Here, the importance of each is evaluated in an attempt to
define the jurisprudential limitations on restrictions that the many may
place on the few.
A. Rights-Based Philosophy and Random Urinalysis
Rights-based88 philosophy emphasizes the integrity of the individual
as central in any legitimate compromise between personal rights and so-
cietal needs, such as a governmental drug testing program targeted at a
subgroup of society. 9 The enterprise of these philosophers is to design a
social system which makes no effort to judge alternative aspirations for
human lives, but instead accords all persons the respect thought to be
due to autonomous beings.90 The rights of the individual are defined
prior to considering means by which society may permissibly interact
with the individual.91 According to Professor Schroeder, "[t]he root idea
is that nonconsensual risks are violations of 'individual entitlement to
personal security and autonomy.' "92
Rights-based philosophers do not, however, take the clearly untena-
ble position that no interference with any particular individual right is
87. See Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 504 (1986).
88. The terms "rights-based" and "neo-Kantian" will be used interchangeably.
89. See Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509-10; see also B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 71-72 (1977); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholar-
ship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1118-30 (1983); Thompson, Drug-Testing: Some Fundamental
Conceptual and Juristic Problems, 22 AKRON L. REV. 123, 126-28 (1988).
90. Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 510 (quoting Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 877 (1984)).
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acceptable. 93 Instead, they argue that the terms on which society deals
with the individual are derived from criteria inherent in maintaining indi-
vidual integrity.94 Ronald Dworkin has referred to these inherent indi-
vidual rights as "trumps"--categorical imperatives controlled by the
individual member of society in conflict with society at large. 95 Rights-
based philosophy can trace its roots to the writings of Thomas Hobbes,
96
Immanuel Kant and John Locke, and finds articulate and more contem-
porary expression in the writings of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and
Charles Fried, among others.97
The real trick for this group of liberal democratic philosophers is to
define the inviolable individual sphere with substantial consideration of
countervailing societal interests, while at the same time avoiding crum-
bling their analysis into mere humanistic utilitarianism" or, perhaps
even worse, defining the individual sphere so narrowly as to leave indi-
vidual rights penurious, meaningless and useless. 99 For instance, Fried
writes:
The picture is of a status quo, a baseline which the actor [the
state] disturbs. Behind [this] idea is Nozick's, Kant's, [and]
Locke's conception of a private domain which defines the indi-
vidual's discretionary space, within which he can work out his
conception of happiness. It is the state's, the law's duty to pro-
93. Id. at 509-11; but see C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 81 (1978) (suggesting that under
some circumstances, once a society defines a right, it can be infringed only by permission of its
holder).
94. A. GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 3 (1980); J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHI-'
LOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 106 n.6 (1984); see generally
Fried, Difficulties in the Economic Analysis of Rights, in MARKETS AND MORALS 175, 185
(1977) (economic model of rights flawed because not premised on integrity of self); Rawls,
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519-22 (1980) (members of a well-
ordered society are free and equal moral persons).
95. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).
96. But see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 440-41 (1986) (discounting suggestion by Pro-
fessor Tushnet that Thomas Hobbes belongs in this group).
97. See Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509-10.
98. Indeed, this has been a fundamental-and influential critique of the jurisprudential bal-
ancing technique. See id. at 511.
99. See J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST 77, 79-80 (1973);
Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509-10. Indeed, from the earliest commentators, the balancing
test in constitutional jurisprudence has been decried as quintessentially utilitarian, depriving
the constitutional absolutes of their Kantian "hard core" of truth. See, e.g., T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-54 (1966); Jacobs & Strossen,
Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of
Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 595, 631 (1985) (fourth amendment bal-
ancing weakens textual meaning).
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tect this privacy .... 100
While this philosophy of jurisprudence pragmatically concedes some de-
gree of relevance to the interests of the many, a tension point is that the
personal rights implicated by a random urinalysis program are particu-
larly, and perhaps peculiarly, dear to the rights-based theorists.
John Rawls illustrates inA Theory of Justice the importance which a
particular liberty can carry."' 1 For example, the particular liberty at
stake in the fitness-for-duty rules controversy might be called "freedom
from government enforced drug testing." John Rawls distinguishes the
abstract concept of "rights" from their perceptible value to the individual
member of society. 102 We plainly see that some rights inherent in a mod-
em liberal democratic political system, such as the right of all citizens to
legal representation in a civil suit for money damages, have little meaning
if the citizen lacks the practical prerequisites, such as the financial means,
to exercise the right. 0 3 It is a trivial deduction, therefore, that this
"right to counsel" would mean less to a poor person than to a rich per-
son. Professor Schroeder writes, "[t]he conception of liberty ... refers to
a formal, legal entitlement, whereas the value of liberty expresses any
individual's ability to take advantage of that liberty."" Such variations
in the worth of particular liberties across societal lines degrades the gen-
erally perceived value of the liberty.1
0 5
Clearly the modem liberty of freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure is highly resistant to discrepancies between different individuals
in society because virtually all individual members of society possess the
prerequisites to exercise the liberty. All members of society have a physi-
cal body and, although some are more sensitive to its invasion than
others, each individual can be presumed to place a relatively high and
consistent value on freedom from its invasion.
Likewise, the individual members of society share a commonality of
concern for freedom to engage in activities which might otherwise be
limited because of the deterrent effect of drug tests. Drug use and testing
100. Schroeder, supra note 87, at 510 n.65 (quoting C. FRIED, Is LIBERTY POSSIBLE? 120
(1982)).
101. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 201-05 (1971).
102. Id. at 204.
103. Id.
104. Schroeder, supra note 87, at 539 (emphasis added).
105. Id. ("The problem, as has been noted by others, is in making the search for the most
extensive 'system of liberties' intelligible while preserving this distinction."). Because the gen-
eralized value of the liberty cannot be uniform, the distinction between a liberty and its value
must be maintained. Id.
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extends across socio-economic class lines,10 6 as do pregnancy, employ-
ment, and other sensitive personal facts either revealed (pregnancy) or
threatened (employment) by drug testing. Therefore, the liberty known
as freedom from unreasonable search and seizure ought to hold a partic-
ularly high rank in any general ordering scheme of liberties.1 7
Analysis suggests that freedom from unwanted search and seizure
may be a particularly prized right of individual members of society, and
helps explain the extreme reluctance of rights-based philosophers, and
the courts that they have influenced, to engage in the open-ended balanc-
ing process of individual and government interests. 0 8 Neo-Kantian the-
orists seek bright-line tests to establish the critical baseline beyond which
the government cannot press. This protects individual integrity while
simultaneously recognizing legitimate societal needs."9 Philosophers
and practitioners have scrutinized with extreme skepticism claims that
more than society's interest in the safety of its individual members can
overcome individual rights.1"
106. For example, the fitness-for-duty rules promulgated by the NRC cover all persons with
unescorted access to the power block. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,471
(1989) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 2, 26). This sweeps in everyone from the chief execu-
tive officer of a major public corporation, to the custodial staff. It is difficult to imagine a more
democratic procedure. See, e.g., Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968).
107. Rawls has laid out an elaborate scheme whereby the various liberties available to indi-
viduals in society would be decided in the first instance by constitutional convention and later,
as necessary, by the political system as "it would be rational for [the individual] to prefer." J.
RAWLS, supra note 101, at 204.
108. See, eg., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment ...require[s] that highly intrusive
searches of this type be based on probable cause, not on the evanescent cost benefit calculations
of agencies or judges.").
109. Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509.
110. Id. at 509 n.64. Justice Scalia's well-received dissent in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab articulates a kind of a weak neo-Kantian fourth amendment jurisprudence,
one with substantial solicitude for the countervailing societal interests. 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1398
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He wrote: "[T]here are some absolutes in Fourth Amendment
law, as soon as those have been left behind and the question comes down to whether a particu-
lar search has been 'reasonable' the answer depends largely upon the social necessity that
prompts the search." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia then cited two of the Court's
less controversial recent fourth amendment decisions. This indicates his discomfort with the
Rehnquist majority's purely utilitarian balancing test in this area of the law. Id. at 1398-99
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)); United States v.
Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 551-52 (1976)).
Not surprisingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall continue to cling to unabashedly neo-
Kantian phraseology, with substantially less regard for society's countervailing interests:
"Without the content which ... [the Warrant Clause] give[s] to the Fourth Amendment['s]
overarching command that searches and seizures be 'reasonable,' the Amendment lies virtually
devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about
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B. Classic Utilitarian Philosophy and Random Urinalysis
Much like rights-based philosophy, where the rhetoric stops utilita-
rian philosophy seeks to aggrandize the worth of the individual in the
modem, liberal democratic state."11 But this emphasis on the individual
comes from a very different perspective. The utilitarian philosophy, in its
most pristine form, asserts that only those laws producing the maximum
quantity of happiness for society in the aggregate are moral.1" 2 These
theorists posit that our general goal should be to formulate laws that can
increase pleasure and decrease pain to resolve conflicts between the indi-
vidual and society. 1 3 Thus, there exists no core imperturbable defensive
shield around the individual, as in the rights-based world. 14 The indi-
vidual is a means to the ends of a richer or happier or better society. 15
In the utilitarian world, the individual holds no trumps.
Utilitarian philosophy in its modem variant owes much to the work
of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill116 Jeremy Bentham wrote:
The State takes upon it to control those acts of a man ... for
two reasons. 1st [sic] that his happiness is the happiness of the
community: 2ndly [sic] that his strength is the strength of the
community. If there be any difference, it is the latter considera-
tion that gives the state the best and most incontestible title it
has thus to interfere ... [I]t is a matter that does not admitt
[sic] of being questioned that the state will be apt to manage
better for other than he will be apt to do / manage / for those
the problems of the day, choose to give to that supple term." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marshall characterized the Skinner majority's holding as abandoning the probable cause
requirement and "the majority substitut[ing] a manipulable balancing inquiry under which,
upon the mere assertion of a "special need," even the deepest dignitary and privacy interest
becomes vulnerable to governmental incursion." Id. at 1425 (Marshall J., dissenting).
111. Two of the most forceful proponents of the interrelationship between utilitarianism
and liberal democracy are Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations
of Equal Protection, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1029 (1980) and Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977-78). Interestingly, Schroeder has documented
that the public seems to find the interrelationship a bit fuzzy. See Schroeder, supra note 87, at
505-06 & n.38 (citing 1983 Harris Poll showing that over 80% of all Americans opposed any
attempt to balance countervailing costs against the competing environmental values in formu-
lating policy).
112. See, eg., Schroeder, supra note 87, at 505-06.
113. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 828, 829-30 (1979).
114. Id. at 831.
115. Id. at 829. See also generally R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT
302-26 (1979).
116. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789); D. LONG, BENTHAM ON LIBERTY: JEREMY BENTHAM'S IDEA OF LIB-
ERTY IN RELATION TO HIS UTILITARIANISM (1977); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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others. 117
The above quoted language would be the quintessential utilitarian justifi-
cation for interference with the individual 1 8 for the betterment of society
through drug testing.
Western jurisprudence dove into utilitarian philosophy with great
relish as it sought an objectively "correct" legal structure consistent with
the liberal ideals of market capitalism." 9 Professor Shiffrin has stated:
"Twentieth Century American legal scholarship has been dominated by
utilitarians-by pragmatists, social engineers, and instrumentalists.
These scholars have been allied with an always-present group of (mainly
Constitutional) theorists who emphasize the need to mix a bit of natural
law into the utilitarian calculus."'12 Perhaps the strongest and best
known contemporary subgroup under the utilitarian umbrella is the law-
and-economics movement, which has neared the jurisprudential summit
in the past decade and shows little sign of decline. 2 Judge Posner has
recently stated that, although he retains his general skepticism regarding
the importance of conventionalist legal theory, he believes law-and-eco-
nomics may yet be the tumbler that opens the lock to an objective and
more scientific understanding of American jurisprudence.
22
Somewhat ironically, virtually all mainstream utilitarian thought
has sought to soften its core truth, namely that the individual members of
society exist as a means to society's greater ends.1 23 Perhaps Mill was the
117. D. LONG, supra note 116, at 72 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 49.
119. Shiffrin, supra note 89, at 1118-28.
120. Id. at 1104.
121. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 95. He wrote: "Some lawyers have been tempted by the
remarkable claim that [the law-and-economics] principle provides all that [legal theory] needs
to construct a comprehensive interpretation of all parts of the law, from constitutional struc-
ture to the details of evidence and procedure." Id. at 444 n.1. See generally G. CALABRFSI,
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); 2 R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
(1977); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). Profes-
sor Schroeder notes that the extent of the relationship between utilitarianism and welfare eco-
nomics "is hotly contested." Schroeder, supra note 87, at 505 & n.34. However, even though
law-and-economics is a subgroup of welfare economic theory, Professor Schroeder's distinction
is not relevant here.
122. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 853 (1988). Judge
Posner writes:
Given the close relationship between means-ends rationality and cost-benefit analy-
sis, and recalling the close relationship.., between logical reasoning and economic
models.., one can begin to understand why economics has made such inroads into
law in recent years .... But law is not merely a translation of or approximation to
economic analysis... not yet, anyway ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-87, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 774-77 (1987).
123. As Schroeder puts it, "utilitarianism makes the status of the individual radically con-
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first to do so, by emphasizing, for example, that the redistribution of
wealth created "justice," and that "justice" is merely a highly focused
category of utility, therefore rendering some redistribution of wealth ap-
propriate.124 Mill further stressed that certain types of "pleasure" had
more inherent value than did others, again tending to make room for
actions which superficially do not appear utilitarian.125
Thus, like rights-based philosophy, utilitarianism in fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence has not merely been some refuge for extremists; 26
utilitarian philosophy currently dominates search-and-seizure law. At
least since Terry v. Ohio,127 most mainstream pretense to "rights as
trumps" has been dropped, and the trend has accelerated since the New
Jersey v. TLO 1 2' decision in 1985.
An understanding of the philosophical roots of fourth amendment
search and seizure law is useful for two reasons. First, the philosophy
establishes jurisprudential parameters for any court analyzing the accept-
ability of a particular government drug testing program. Second, it
should instruct those lawyers opposing any given drug testing scheme
that they must focus their analysis to adapt to the utilitarian philosophy
as well as to their more-cherished Kantian themes. This Article will re-
turn to the philosophy of drug testing later, when looking specifically at
the fitness-for-duty regulations. In the meantime, this Article's daunting
task is to pull together the strands of drug testing jurisprudence into a
coherent generalized theory.
III. A GENERALIZED THEORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED TO DRUG TESTING
The fourth amendment is the primary legal obstacle in the path of
fitness-for-duty regulations: 129 "[T]he right of the people to be secure in
tingent. The individual's status will be preserved only so long as that status contributes to
increasing total [societal] utility." Schroeder, supra note 87, at 509.
124. See Shiffrin, supra note 89, at 1115 n.50.
125. Id. at 1214.
126, Id.
127. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (allows search of person without probable cause when reasonably
necessary for protection of officers and others).
128. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of high school student's purse reasonable because schools
have special needs: fighting drugs and establishing environment conducive to learning).
129. Other colorable challenges to drug testing have been made. See, e.g., Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989) (Federal Railroad Safety Act);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (fifth amendment to United States Constitution);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the Fed-
eral Rehabilitation Act); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 564-66 (8th
Cir. 1988) (first amendment to United States Constitution).
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... 1 3o The fourth amendment ap-
plies only where the putative violator acts as "an agent of the Govern-
ment or with the participation or knowledge of any government
official." '131 The mandatory testing provisions under the fitness-for-duty
rules require the "compulsion of sovereign authority" for their applica-
tion and therefore the fourth amendment applies. 132 It is equally well
established that the seizure of the individual tested and the obtaining and
examining of the urine or breath sample constitute one or more
"searches" for fourth amendment purposes. 133  However, the United
States Supreme Court has noted that: "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amend-
ment is applicable to the drug and alcohol testing prescribed by... [par-
ticular regulations] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards
governing such intrusions. For the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
scribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable."' 134
Historically, "reasonableness" in the context of "searches" was
equated with the probable cause standard, meaning that "probable
cause," however defined, was a necessary, though not sufficient, condi-
tion for a "reasonable" search. 135 Terry v. Ohio 136 was the earliest signif-
icant break from this position. 137 In Terry, the Court allowed officers to
stop and frisk a person they suspected of casing a store for a robbery
without probable cause for purposes of an investigation. 138 Under Terry,
whether or not such a search violates the fourth amendment depends on
the reasonableness of the officers' conduct under the particular circum-
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).
132. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-12 ("The Government has removed all legal barriers to the
testing authorized ... and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but
also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions."). Notably, the fitness-for-duty rules make
considerable allowances for individual nuclear utilities to add new substances to the test list, or
to lower cut-off levels fitness-for-duty programs. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg.
24,468 (1989) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 2, 26). A program made substantially more
rigorous than the minimum fitness-for-duty program may be deemed to not involve state
action.
133. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412-13; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
134. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413-14 (citations omitted). See also Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1390.
135. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing probable
cause requirement "deeply imbedded in our constitutional history").
136. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
137. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up to today have been permitted to
effect... searches without warrants only when [they had] probable cause.").
138. Id. at 30.
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stances. 139 Starting with New Jersey v. TLO " in 1985, the Supreme
Court has moved away from a purely syllogistic determination of "rea-
sonableness," mostly in those factual settings which present government
authorities with vexing problems implicating what the Court has called
"special needs."' 41 For instance, in TLO the Supreme Court allowed
school officials to search a high school student's purse, holding that the
school's special need to combat drug use and maintain school decorum
outweighed the student's privacy interest.142 The Court has explicitly
adopted a balancing test in preference to the syllogistic "probable cause"
technique in these "special needs" cases. 43 The balancing test weighs
the invasiveness of the search against the governmental interest which
the search serves. 144 This very general fourth amendment primer allows
this Article to (1) recount four decisions of special relevance to the fit-
ness-for-duty rules, and (2) present a generalized theory of drug testing
law.
A. Four Leading Decisions
In March of 1989, in a pair of long-awaited rulings, the Supreme
Court upheld both the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regula-
tions governing drug and alcohol testing of train employees, 145 and
United States Customs Service rules mandating testing of agents.
1 4 6
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association 141 the FRA reg-
ulations were in issue. The FRA regulations provide for mandatory test-
ing upon the happening of certain unusual operational events:
[T]esting is required following a "major train accident".., that
involves (i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material ac-
companied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) dam-
139. Id. at 27.
140. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979).
141. See, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (search of probationer's home);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (plurality opinion) (search of government
employee's workplace).
142. TLO, 469 U.S. at 339-43.
143. See, eg., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878-79 (search of probationer's home); New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708-11 (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses);
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720 (search of government employee's workplace).
144. See, e.g., Grffin, 483 U.S. at 881; O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721; see also Skinner, 109 S.
Ct. at 1414-22; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391-98.
145. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
146. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
147. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
June 1990] 1175
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
age to railroad property of $500,000 . .. after an "impact
accident," which is defined as a collision that results in a re-
portable injury, or in damage to railroad property of $50,000 or
more .... Finally, the railroad is also obligated to test after
"any train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty rail-
road employee."14
The Court noted that railroads were empowered to draft regulations
mandating testing of employees who violated specifically designated
safety rules, or to test based on the "reasonable suspicion" of a supervisor
that a covered employee was under the influence of alcohol even where
there existed no other basis to test. 1
49
The FRA regulations apply only to "covered service employees."'1 50
Apparently, most covered service employees engage in "safety-sensitive
tasks," although the Court was oblique on the extent to which other cov-
ered service employees may have no safety function.15 '
Under the FRA rules, positive test results cannot result in adminis-
trative action against the employee until the FRA affords "an opportu-
nity to respond in writing."' 52 The penalty for refusal to take a drug or
alcohol test is exclusion from covered service for up to nine months.153
Law enforcement authorities have access to the samples "upon service of
appropriate compulsory process on the custodian," although the regula-
tions state that they are not designed to assist in the prosecution of cov-
ered service employees. 54
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, salvoed with a dramatic ac-
count of the venerable bugaboo of alcohol abuse on American railroads,
148. Id. at 1408-09 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 1409.
150. Id. at 1408. "Covered service employee" is an industry term referring to "employees
assigned to perform service subject to the Hours of Service Act of 1907." Id.; see also Hours of
Service Employees, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1982).
151. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (noting that Hours of Service Employees "include" persons
"engaged in safety sensitive tasks").
152. Id. at 1409.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1415 n.5. The Court professed to be nonplussed by the opportunity of other
courts to view the tests as criminal prosecution evidence. The Court wrote:
The Agency explained ... that it intends to retain such samples primarily "for its
own purposes .... ." While this provision might be read broadly to authorize the
release of biological samples to law enforcement authorities, the record does not dis-
close that it was intended to be, or actually has been, so used. Indeed ... [respon-
dents] do not seriously contend that this provision, or any other part of the
administrative scheme, was designed as "a 'pretext' to enable law enforcement au-
thorities to gather evidence of penal law violations."
Id. (citations omitted).
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and the more recent expansion of the problem to include drugs."'s The
Court also identified some significant (though anecdotal) evidence of the
connection between drug use and certain severe railroad accidents or
near misses 156
The Court gave little pause on the issue of whether the regulations
would result in a fourth amendment "search." 117 The Court, however,
passed on the opportunity to announce whether the "initial detention to
procure the evidence, ... obtaining and examining the evidence," and the
physical seizure of the tested employee during the test procedures would
each be deemed a distinct fourth amendment search. 158
The "special needs" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant
and probable cause requirements was next embraced. 159 The Court cited
the lack of discretion vested in the enforcing officials,1" the steady elimi-
nation of drugs from the blood stream,16" ' and the problem of forcing
railroad officials to master "the intricacies of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence" as supporting elimination of the warrant
requirement. 162
The Court then plunged into the more controversial portion of the
opinion, which dispensed with the probable cause and "reasonable suspi-
cion" constitutional floors previously thought by many to exist within
the special needs context. The Court wrote, "In limited circumstances,
where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspi-
155. Id. at 1407-08 n.1.
156. Id. at 1408 ("Some of these accidents [caused at least in part by drugs and alcohol]
resulted in the release of hazardous materials and, in one case, the ensuing pollution required
the evacuation of an entire Louisiana community.").
157. Id. at 1413 n.4. The Court easily concluded that "the tests are attributable to the
Government or its agents." Id. at 1441. This conclusion was foregone with respect to the
mandatory provisions of the FRA rules, but even the discretionary provisions, the Court
found, would be exercised under "the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and partic-
ipation .... ." Id. at 1412.
158. Id. at 1413 nA. The Court wrote: "It is not necessary to our analysis in this case,
however, to characterize the taking of blood or urine samples as a seizure of those bodily
fluids, for the privacy expectations protected by this characterization are adequately taken into
account by our conclusion that such intrusions are searches." Id. The Court also stated: "For
present purposes, it suffices to note that any limitation on an employee's freedom of movement
that is necessary to obtain the blood, urine, or breath samples contemplated by the regulations
must be considered in assessing the intrusiveness of the searches effected by the Government's
testing program." Id. at 1413.
159. Id. at 1414.
160. Id. at 1415-16 & n.6.
161. Id. at 1416.
162. Id.
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cion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion."' 63
The FRA's blood and breath testing procedures were found to be
minimally intrusive.'" Blood testing, the Court noted, is a routine part
of life, and has long since received its validation in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia. 1 65 Likewise, the Court observed that the breath tests called for by
the FRA rules "do not require piercing the skin and may be conducted
safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconven-
ience or embarrassment," and thus were less intrusive than blood tests.166
The Court conceded the intrusiveness of urine testing, which re-
quires the performance of an "excretory function traditionally shielded
by great privacy."' 167 However, the Court relied on the medical environ-
ment in which the test is administered as sufficient to ameliorate some
privacy concerns, 16 and, most importantly, the highly regulated envi-
ronment, not just of the railroads generally, but of covered service em-
ployees specifically. The Court wrote, "Though some of the privacy
interests implicated by the toxicological testing.., might be viewed as
significant in other contexts, logic and history show that a diminished
expectation of privacy attaches to information relating to the physical
condition of covered employees .... ,169
Against these limited threats to employee privacy, the Court bal-
anced the government's "compelling" interest in public safety.' 7 ' The
Court, comparing covered service employees with nuclear plant employ-
ees,' 7 ' deemed the FRA regulations effective both in ferreting out drug
163. Id. at 1417.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). In Schmerber v. California,
the Court found that a blood sample taken against the defendant's will, in a hospital, was not
an unreasonable search. 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). The Court relied on the "exigency" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement to reach this conclusion. Id. at 770-72. In other words, the
Court found that the officer could reasonably believe that the situation was.an emergency and
thus there was no need to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 770.
166. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.
167. Id. at 1418.
168. Id. ("While we would not characterize these additional privacy concerns [of tested
individuals] as minimal in most contexts, we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the
intrusiveness of the collection process.").
169. Id. at 1419. "More importantly, the expectations of privacy of covered employees are
diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to en-
sure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employ-
ees." Id. at 1418.
170. Id. at 1419.
171. "Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities,
employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss
. ...." Id  (citations omitted).
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use and in investigating the causes of railway mishaps. 172
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. 173 Accord-
ing to the dissent, the FRA regulations contravened the fourth amend-
ment, whether judged under the traditional pre-Terry syllogistic
"probable cause" view of the fourth amendment,174 or under the Burger-
Rehnquist court's post-TLO balancing test. 175 Justice Marshall's opinion
ridiculed the majority's willingness to eviscerate the reasonable suspicion
standard employed in post-Terry cases involving analogies to "stop-and-
frisk" searches. 176 The dissent leaped on the government's concession
that no individualized (much less "reasonable") suspicion would be pres-
ent during most tests under the FRA procedures. 177 Justice Marshall
also returned the majority's volley on Schmerber's teaching.
1 78
Even under the post-TLO balancing test, Justice Marshall would de-
cide against the government. Justice Marshall emphasized the FRA
rules' invasiveness, by focusing on: (1) their likely use by law enforce-
172. Id. at 1419-20. The Court conceded to the Court of Appeals that urine testing may
not directly spotlight current on-the-job impairment. Id. at 1421. The Court nonetheless re-
jected the lower court's conclusion that a testing program not plausibly directed at on-the-job
impairment is per se invalid. Id. at 1420-21. The Court cited two girders for its alternative
conclusion: (1) the FRA regulations did in fact pursue current impairment to the significant
extent that blood testing is used; and (2) the urine tests need only gather evidence tending to
prove current impairment of hours of service employees and, since past use tends to prove
current use, the FRA tests did gather evidence tending to prove current impairment. Id. at
1421. The Court explained that, "[e]ven if urine test results disclosed nothing more specific
than the recent use of controlled substances by a covered employee.., this information would
provide the basis for further investigative work designed to determine whether the employee
used drugs at the relevant times." Id.
173. Id. at 1422 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens concurred in the judg-
ment and in much of the Court's reasoning, he refused to join the majority's validation of the
deterrence rationale for the FRA tests. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Since the scheme would
be an ineffective deterrent, Justice Stevens determined that it was neither "necessary [n]or
sufficient" to justify testing. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). His point was that such an ineffec-
tive deterrent serves no legitimate government interest. However, most courts would hold that
although a less effective deterrent is less important, it is also less intrusive, and therefore Ste-
vens' opinion is questionable on this point.
174. Id. at 1426-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[T]he majority errs even under its own utilita-
rian standards, trivializing the raw intrusiveness of, and overlooking serious conceptual and
operational flaws in, the FRA's testing program." Id at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1423-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1427 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Far from reading Schmerber as support for the
majority's compelling, "minimally intrusive" view of blood testing, Justice Marshall found
that it demanded a "clear indication" of the justification for a compulsory blood test, which
the government conceded would be lacking in its program. Id. at 1427-28 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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ment; 179 and (2) the intrusiveness involved in the taking of samples."' 0
He was also unimpressed by the government's side of the balance. Jus-
tice Marshall particularly criticized the deterrent value of the FRA pro-
gram and argued that the elimination of deterrence left the majority with
only the "slender thread" of accident investigation "from which to hang
such an intrusive program."1'81
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,182 the Supreme
Court turned its attention to the United States Custom Service rules that
mandated drug testing for certain agents. The Court upheld testing of
customs service employees transferring to positions involving drug in-
terdiction 183 or requiring the employee to carry firearms.18 4 A slim five-
Justice majority held that the government's interest in public safety and
effective drug interdiction outweighed the intrusion on fourth amend-
ment values and that the customs rules were therefore constitutional.
18 5
As in Skinner, the Von Raab majority opened by sketching the face
of the crisis, this time in drug interdiction, and citing statistics and anec-
dotes.18 6 The Court skipped the issue of whether testing under the rules
constituted a search187 and, after declaring that the customs services' spe-
cial concerns made for a "special needs" case not requiring any individu-
alized suspicion,188 the Court moved immediately into balancing the
contesting interests.
189
179. Id. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Most strikingly, the agency's regulations not
only do not forbid, but, in fact, appear to invite criminal prosecutors to obtain the blood and
urine samples drawn by the FRA and use them as the basis of criminal investigations and
trials.").
180. Id. at 1431-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The majority also overlooks needlessly intru-
sive aspects of the testing process itself.").
181. Id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
183. Id. at 1390.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1397-98. The customs regulations required each employee slated for a promo-
tion to provide a urine sample to be analyzed under a two-step procedure following, for the
most part, Health and Human Services guidelines. Id. at 1388 & n.1. The test results cannot
be released to law enforcement officers without the approval of the tested employee. Id. at
1389. However, a positive test blocks the employee's promotion, and nothing in the customs
rules prohibits use of the test results as a basis for disciplinary action. Id. at 1389.
186. Id. at 1387 ("In 1987 alone, Customs agents seized drugs with a retail value of nearly 9
billion dollars .... As a necessary response [to the violence] many Customs operatives carry
and use firearms in connection with their official duties.").
187. Id. at 1390.
188. Id. at 1391.
189. Id. at 1391-96.
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The majority opinion outlined somewhat broader government inter-
ests than those with which the Skinner Court grappled. First, the major-
ity stated that the governmental interest in effective drug interdiction
creates "a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction per-
sonnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judg-
ment."19 Second, and not entirely separable conceptually, the Court
stated that both the public and customs employees must be protected
from the use of deadly force by impaired customs agents.191
These "compelling" government interests weighed heavily against
what the Court held to be fairly paltry interference with legitimate pri-
vacy expectations. 192 Analogizing the tested customs agents to United
States Mint employees and American soldiers, the majority reasoned that
the customs employees being transferred have, like soldiers and mint
workers, diminished privacy expectations in their urine.1 9 The Court
stated, "[b]ecause successful performance of their duties depends
uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot rea-
sonably expect to keep from the [Customs] Service personal information
that bears directly on their fitness."
194
The Court tied the knot on its balancing by rejecting the need for a
systematic showing of a significant drug problem.195 The majority effec-
tively conceded the premise that testing customs agents was unlikely to
identify users and that the customs service had practically no drug prob-
lem. 196 However, in comparing the customs service's program to hous-
ing code and commercial airliner inspections, the majority asserted that a
190. Id. at 1393.
191. Id. The listed governmental interests are not entirely distinct. It should be obvious
that a prime reason to demand "unimpeachable integrity and judgment" of armed customs
agents is to avoid "a momentary lapse of attention [which] can have disastrous consequences."
Id. (quoting Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1419 (1989)). Thus, the majority's citation of two sepa-
rate interests is somewhat misleading.
The majority's argument that intrusion on fourth amendment values through drug testing
"will itself further Fourth Amendment values" can be described most charitably as a throw
away argument. Id. If almost any government activity impinging on fourth amendment pro-
tection were seen as inuring to the benefit of the fourth amendment values of others, this
approach could be taken to a further logical vista and, before too long, the Court's approach
would wipe out the protections offered by the fourth amendment.
192. Id. at 1393-94.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1394.
195. Id. at 1395. The Court viewed the contention that the program is unjustified because it
is not based on a belief that testing will reveal drug use by covered employees as "evincing an
unduly narrow view of the context in which the Service's testing program was implemented.
Petitioners do not dispute.., that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting
our society today." Id.
196. Id. at 1394-95.
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worthwhile deterrence program need not actually deter much evil, so
long as the evil to be deterred was horrible enough.'9 7 Thus, the govern-
ment's desire to prevent the "pervasive societal problem" of drug abuse
from spreading to a particular agency was deemed a compelling
interest.198
Finally, the Court, in its clearest limit to date on drug testing, re-
manded to the court of appeals a portion of the dispute dealing with a
third group of tested customs employees-those who are "required to
handle classified material."' 99 The Supreme Court fully embraced the
constitutionality of pre-promotion testing of persons handling "classified
material" and reaffirmed the government's right to protect "its
secrets." 2" However, the majority expressed doubt as to whether all em-
ployees covered by the customs service rules (such as baggage clerks and
electric equipment repairers) would be likely to gain access to sensitive
information,2"' or whether, in fact, the customs service "defined this cat-
egory of employees more broadly than necessary to meet the purposes"
of the customs service.20 2
The principal dissent was authored by Justice Scalia, with Justice
Stevens joining,201 and Justices Marshall and Brennan endorsing but not
joining.2° Justice Scalia's dissent was strident in tone, focusing not as
much on the inherent value of individual rights as on the government
interests to be balanced against those rights. He wrote:
I joined the Court's opinion [in Skinner] because the demon-
strated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class
of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such
use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of
protecting society. I decline to join the Court's opinion in the
present case because neither the frequency of use nor connec-
tion to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the
Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and
human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.
205
197. Id. at 1395 n.3 (quoting Judge Friendly) United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500
(2d Cir. 1974)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1396-98.
200. Id. at 1397 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also stated: "The Court agrees that this con-
stitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment-and I think it obvious that it is a
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The Scalia dissent emphasized the near-total lack of even anecdotal sup-
port for either the "public safety" or the "public trust" testing ratio-
nales20 6 He seized on prior bragging by the Commissioner of Customs
that "customs is largely drug free"207 as affirmative evidence that any
drug problem at the customs service was an illusion. 20 8 Furthermore,
Justice Scalia observed that once the rules were applied to those outside
the hard-core group of drug interdiction agents, the relationship between
testing and the public safety and trust issues attenuate to the point of
"expos[ing] vast numbers of public employees to [a] . . . needless
indignity.
20 9
Justice Scalia identified a third state interest relied on by the major-
ity: the government's anti-drug public relations campaign. 210 He stated:
There is only one apparent basis that sets the testing at issue
here apart from all these other situations-but it is not a basis
upon which the Court is willing to rely. I do not believe for a
minute that the driving force behind these drug-testing rules
was any of the feeble justifications put forward by counsel here
and accepted by the Court. The only plausible explanation...
is what the Commissioner himself offered ... to Customs Ser-
vice employees [in] announcing the program: "Implementation
of the drug screening program would set an important example
in our country's struggle with this most serious threat to our
national health and security." ... What better way to show that
the Government is serious about its "war on drugs" than to
subject its employees on the front line of that war to this inva-
sion of their privacy and affront to their dignity?211
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that government-by-example added to
the Customs Service's legitimate interests, arguing that "symbolism, even
symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, can-
not validate an otherwise unreasonable search.
212
type of search particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ("The test results [of Customs Service employees]
have fulfilled those hopes and expectations. According to the Service's counsel, out of 3,600
employees tested, no more than 5 tested positive for drugs.").
207. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1400-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3. Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,2 13 a district court case, is
also important because it was the first to deal with challenges to the con-
stitutionality of a nuclear power plant "fitness-for-duty program" involv-
ing random drug and alcohol testing. 214 The Nebraska Public Power
District (NPPD) operated a publicly owned nuclear power plant under a
NRC license.2 15 The NPPD, under the prodding of the NRC and indus-
try groups, adopted its first fitness-for-duty program in 1985.216 The ini-
tial program included urinalysis testing for suspected drug use, pre-
employment, on transfer, and annual testing for security force personnel
and the NRC-licensed control room operators. There was to be no ran-
dom testing.
217
The program was later revised to include random testing, to im-
prove chain-of-custody procedures, and to strengthen the employee
assistance program. 218 Also, after some equivocation and more NRC
prodding, the NPPD decided to expand its program beyond the security
force and licensed control room operators to include all persons with
unescorted access to the power block.2 19 The plaintiffs, staff engineers
who spent six to seven hours each month in the power block, were fired
after refusing to be randomly tested.22 0 They challenged the program as
applied on several constitutional grounds, including the fourth amend-
213. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
214. Id. at 1515-16.
215. Id. at 1512 ("NPPD owns Cooper Nuclear Station... a nuclear power plant. As a
licensee of the ... NRC... Cooper Nuclear Station ... is a heavily regulated facility.").
216. Id. at 1515. Apparently, the program adopted by NPPD "represent[ed] the 'lowest
common denominator' to which all [Nuclear Utilities Management and Human Resources
Committee (NUMARC)] members will agree." Id. at 1513. The NUMARC proposal has
been seen as a desirable alternative to NRC rule making. Id.
217. Id. at 1515 ("In determining who would be subject to the testing program, the initial
focus was centered on the security force and licensed operators, since each was a source of
concern for the NRC."). Under the initial program, the tested individual provided a sample
under supervised conditions. Id. A laboratory analysis was performed, and the tested individ-
ual's supervisor was notified of the results. Id. The tested individual could request confirma-
tion of a positive test, but on confirmation, the employee either entered the NPPD employee
assistance program, or was subject to discharge. Id. In any event, an individual who tested
positive lost unescorted access to the power block. Id.
218. Id. at 1516.
219. Id. at 1515 ("[The second program] applies to NPPD employees as well as contractors,
consultants, vendor employees, NPPD senior management, and NRC employees who are per-
mitted unescorted access to protected areas."). Interestingly, the trial court focused almost
entirely on the second scheme's randomness component instead of the second scheme's sub-
stantial expansion beyond employees in the operator and security forces. Id. at 1516. No
doubt this was influenced by the "as applied" nature of the challenge.
220. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 563 (8th Cir. 1988).
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ment.2 21 The district court rejected their challenge, relying without de-
tailed analysis on the "administrative search standard exception to the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement." '222
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed vigorously.
223
The appellate court found that the state interests in protecting the public,
from radiation and loss-of-capacity accident costs, and plant employees,
from radiation and mundane accidents, outweighed the "diminished"
constitutional interests of the plaintiff.224 The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' assertion that the so-called "defense-in-depth" engineered safety fea-
tures at nuclear power plants eliminated the radiation risk to the public
generated by an unsupervised, impaired employee in the power block.2 25
The court stated:
We do not find plaintiffs' contentions persuasive. Perhaps [the
plant] was designed to withstand an impaired operator. This
does not make superfluous the addition of new measures [Le.,
random urinalysis testing] to make the plant even safer. Surely
the update and reevaluation of safety concerns should not end
because the plant was considered to be safe initially.22 6
The Eighth Circuit found that "mundane industrial accidents" and costs
221. Id. at 564-66 (first amendment); id. at 566-67 (fourth amendment); id. at 567 (fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments).
222. Id. at 566 ("Thus, we believe that the District Court was correct in holding that the
facts of this case place it squarely within the administrative-search exception .... "). The
administrative search exception is an exception to the warrant requirement. Generally, a war-
rant is needed in order for a search to be permissible under the fourth amendment. However,
if two interrelated requirements are satisfied, a warrantless search will be permitted under the
administrative search exception. First, there must be a strong state interest in conducting the
search. Second, the industry involved must be pervasively regulated so that the regulations
reduce privacy expectations. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
223. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988).
224. Id. at 567. The Eighth Circuit apparently declined to rely on what was characterized
at the district court level as the state's "substantial interest in the maintenance of a positive
public perception of plant safety." Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1519. Although the district court
rested only implicitly on this rationale in upholding the testing scheme, it will be seen that this
argument remains a highly debatable-and emotionally charged-proposition.
225. Rushton, 844 F.2d at 565. The plaintiff's rejected argument stated that, since NRC
regulations provide for protection of the public even in the event of total operator failure (e.g.,
through use of a massive three-foot thick containment structure around the pldnt), a lapse by
an operator could, by definition, pose no public safety threat. See Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at
1520. Notably, the Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument in the context of a some-
what specious first amendment claim rather than on the fourth amendment, although the for-
mer analysis seems to be incorporated into the latter. Rushton, 844 F.2d at 566 ("The state's
interest in conducting this search and why the plan was implemented have already been dis-
cussed in detail.").
226. Rushton, 844 F.2d at 565.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
of less than perfectly efficient operations to ratepayers were made more
likely if employees were impaired.
227
Against these "compelling" governmental interests militated pri-
vacy interests which had already been radically diminished by the history
of intensive regulation of persons with access to nuclear power plants.
22 8
Also influencing the Eighth Circuit was the absence of program provi-
sions allowing for use of the urine samples as a basis for criminal prose-
cution.229 The court found that "the need for protection... diminishes
if the investigation is neither designed to enforce criminal laws nor likely
to be used to bring criminal charges .... ,23O Under these circumstances,
the court held the state's interests outweighed those of the individual,
and Rushton's challenge failed.231
The final particularly interesting case is Alverado v. Washington
Public Power Supply System (WPPSS).232 The case tested the constitu-
tionality of an early fitness-for-duty program adopted by the WPPSS in
1986.233 The program utilized only pre-employment and for-cause
urinalysis testing of employees who had unescorted access to the power
block.234 No random urinalysis was involved. 235 The WPPSS program
incorporated confirmatory testing, tight chain-of-custody controls, non-
witnessed urine sample collection, strict confidentiality of test results,
and a maximum sanction of a six month preclusion from working at the
WPPSS station.236
The Washington Supreme Court directly reviewed the trial court's
summary judgment for the WPPSS and easily concluded at the outset
that federal search and seizure law applied.237 The court then considered
whether the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement
applied and, if it did, whether this particular administrative search was
reasonable. 238  Following the doctrine of Rushton and McDonell v.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 566.
229. Id. at 567.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759 P.2d 427 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
233. Id. at 427, 759 P.2d at 429.
234. Id. at 428, 759 P.2d at 429.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 429-33, 759 P.2d at 430-32. "Since this safety issue was not 'expressly ceded to
the States' . . . federal law and regulations preempt state law. The constitutional validity of
this drug testing program ... must be determined by reference to the federal constitution
alone." Id. at 433, 759 P.2d at 432 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 435-41, 759 P.2d at 433-35.
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Hunter,239 the court embraced the administrative search exception, be-
cause employees in nuclear power plants are the essential target of long-
standing administrative regulation.2' Pervasive regulation, the court
held, emasculated any otherwise reasonable expectations of privacy held
by the employee.241
The court held that the particular administrative search at WPPSS
was reasonable because it was "necessary" to serve a "substantial" gov-
ernment interest.242 The court stated that in "ensur[ing] that personnel
in vital areas of a nuclear power facility are fit for duty in one of the most
sensitive and demanding industries in our economy; the public safety
concerns are overwhelming. 2 43 The court noted in conclusion that the
WPPSS program survived constitutional analysis, not merely based on a
balancing test, but because "the program [met] the strict criteria an-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court to justify a warrantless ad-
ministrative search."
'244
B. A Systematic Critique of Drug-Testing Law, Circa 1990
1. The individual interest in the core balance
The individual interests threatened by a testing program are typi-
cally tallied as the first step in drug-testing analysis,245 regardless of the
philosophical pedigree of the court involved.246 This first step requires
conforming the "search and seizure" text of the fourth amendment with
239. 809 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1987) (correctional officers may be strip-searched upon
mere suspicion because their subjective expectations of privacy are diminished while within
confines of prison).
240. Alverado, 111 Wash. 2d at 436-37, 759 P.2d at 434 ("The pervasiveness of the regula-
tory scheme gives advance warning to those employed in the nuclear power industry that their
legitimate expectations of privacy are substantially diminished.").
241. Id.
242. Id. at 440, 759 P.2d at 435.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 441, 759 P.2d at 436. Apparently, the fact that the "strict criteria announced by
the United States Supreme Court to justify a warrantless administrative search" were them-
selves based on a balancing test escaped the notice of the Washington Supreme Court in its
rush to frame its decision as a syllogism. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987)
(warrantless inspection of commercial premises may be reasonable because privacy interests of
owner are weakened and government interests in regulating particular businesses are
heightened).
245. The first step is determining whether state action is present. However, the rest of this
Article will assume that state action is not a significant issue. But see Davis v. Florida Power
& Light Co., Nuclear Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 19,192-93, at 20,492 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1989).
246. Although the rhetorical examination of individual interests is not automatically made
first, the inquiry is invariably made. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417-19 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1989). This Article frequently
refers to the balancing of the individual interests versus the governmental public safety interest
June 1990] 1187
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1153
the multiple governmental intrusions involved. Although the Supreme
Court has declined to take a firm position on the issue of whether the
government must defend more than one "search or seizure,"" this Arti-
cle will present the threat to the individual in three distinct conceptual
"searches and seizures:" (1) the physical seizure of the body contempo-
raneous with the taking of the sample; (2) the seizure of bodily activity
before the search; and (3) the seizure of the body after the test.248 This
division is not inconsistent with the substantive outcome of the search
and seizure precedents.
The physical seizure is the most familiar image-the testee hustled
away from his comfortable and familiar workplace to a closed room,
stripped of outer garments, with another person only a few feet away
during the urination, taking in the sound, smell, and possibly the sight.249
Courts invariably consider the extent of the physical seizure to be an
important concern, and therefore evaluate the physical conditions of the
test as a factor in balancing the interests. 250 To a lesser extent, courts
will also weigh lost time on the testee's side of the balancing test. Since
the employer is master of the employee's time during the work day, how-
ever, this interest is a very junior partner in the physical seizure
as "core analysis," because it is undertaken without regard to whether the analysis is neo-
Kantian or utilitarian.
247. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 ("[W]e need not characterize the employer's antecedent
interference with the employee's freedom of movement as an independent Fourth Amendment
seizure .... [Ilt suffices to note that any limitation on an employee's freedom of movement...
must be considered in assessing the intrusiveness of the . . . testing program.") (citations
omitted).
248. There is nothing magical about the precise delineation of the "searches and seizures"
presented here. However, the framework has the virtues of minimal overlap among various
factors affecting the invasiveness of each distinct search, and is intuitively easy to grasp and
manipulate. See McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C.L. REV. 585, 622-25 (1988). It will
be seen that the costs involved in making the effort to separate the "searches and seizures" is
outweighed by the benefits of a less cryptic analysis.
249. Justice Scalia invoked these images in his Von Raab dissent by taking Justice Ken-
nedy's attempt at unemotional, scientific description in the majority opinion and diverting it
into wry irony. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Government asserts
it can demand that employees perform 'an excretory function traditionally shielded by great
privacy,' while 'a monitor of the same sex ... remains close at hand to listen for the normal
sounds.' ") (citations omitted).
250. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417-18 (considering physical circumstances of test,
particularly noting "medical environment" and lack of direct observation); Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. at 1394 n.2 ("There is no direct observation of the act of urination, as the employee may
provide a specimen in the privacy of a stall."); id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
monitors are "close at hand"). But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885
F.2d 884, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Neither can we conclude that testing in a medical environ-
ment is a sine qua non of constitutionally permissible urine testing.., the regulations approved
in Von Raab provided for samples to be collected by non-medical personnel in a public
restroom.").
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analysis.25 l
But even a testing program free of interference with the physical
sovereignty of the individual during the test would involve, as courts
have properly recognized, other tangible searches or seizures.25 2 First, a
pre-test or "antecedent" seizure is involved. This seizure consists of
physical and psychological parameters placed on the testee's liberty even
before the actual sampling takes place.2" 3 To judge the significance of
this part of the equation, a court will consider the following factors: (1)
adequacy of chain-of-custody procedures, 254 reflecting self-imposed ac-
tivity limits because of fear of erroneous test results; (2) reliability of tests
performed; 55 (3) test frequency and predictability; 5 6 (4) the size of the
251. In fact, Skinner addressed this point directly. The Court wrote, "Ordinarily, an em-
ployee consents to significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where necessary for his
employment, and few are free to come and go as they please during working hours. Any
additional interference... cannot, by itself, be said to infringe significant privacy interests."
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (citation omitted).
252. Such a program would so ameliorate the physical aspects of the seizure as to make any
constitutional challenge meaningless. For example, future technology may permit blood,
breath or urine sampling without any perceptible physical impact on the testee, and may even
permit such sampling without the testee's knowledge that the sample was being taken.
253. Obviously, test procedures which were not perceptible to the testee, and which were
perfectly tailored to flawlessly detect only drug use and nothing else, would still raise constitu-
tional questions, because of the self-imposed liberty restrictions which the individual endures
prior to testing. Notably, with rapid advances in testing technology, this hypothetical may not
remain fanciful forever.
254. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1409 (describing handling of samples); In re Seelig v. Koeh-
ler, 151 A.D.2d 53, 69-70, 546 N.Y.S.2d 828, 838 (1989) (upholding testing scheme in part on
strength of chain-of-custody procedures).
255. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421 n.10 ("The Court of Appeals also expressed concern
that the tests might be quite unreliable, and thus unreasonable. The record compiled by the
Agency... does not support [the deterrent effect of drug testing]"); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1394 n.2 ("the combination of [tests] ... is highly accurate").
256. The Supreme Court considered an extremely predictable testing program. Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. at 1394 n.2 (upon-transfer application). The Supreme Court also considered a mod-
erately predictable testing program. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421 & n.10 (post-incident). The
Court, however, has not considered an extremely unpredictable program, such as random test-
ing. Thus there is no Court guidance on the importance of the predictability of testing. How-
ever, it was immediately established by the courts, following Skinner and Von Raab, that while
the random nature of a program "is a relevant consideration," it does not demand "a funda-
mentally different analysis from that pursued... in Von Raab." Harmon v. Thornburg, 878
F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884
F.2d 603, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (following Harmon analysis), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864
(1990); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, No. 88-8511 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 7, 1989) (LEXIS-3664, Genfed library, Dist file) (distinguishing non-random program
from random). But see Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986, 991 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding Skin-
ner and Von Raab require "substantial generalized suspicion," apparently leaving random test-
ing substantially more problematic). Although it is established that randomness is a balancing
factor in acceptable analysis, questions have even arisen as to which litigant-government or
testee-randomness favors. Although the conventional answer is the testee, the randomness
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tested population257 (for facial challenges only); (5) the number of drugs
for which a person is tested;258 (6) the drug cut-off levels;25 9 and (7) the
secondary information revealed by the testing procedure.260 The extent
to which individuals in a tested population restrict their activities because
of their knowledge that they will or could be tested is a function of these
factors, and should be seen as a classic fourth amendment "seizure."
Even if a drug testing program could be created without any physi-
cal invasion or any antecedent activity restriction, precedents reveal a
third individual interest: freedom from post-test "seizure." This third
type of seizure reflects governmental restrictions on, or consequences for,
the testee such as loss of employment 26' or loss of freedom from impris-
could conceivably favor the government by eliminating trace elements of discretion found in
programs with only moderately predictable testing, such as the program at issue in Skinner.
See Government Employees, 885 F.2d at 891 ("[w]hile it is true that random testing may in-
crease employee anxiety and the invasion of subjective expectations of privacy, it also limits
discretion in the selection process"); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that random testing of prisoners for drug use or AIDS may be acceptable), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 871 (1990).
257. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396-97 (program overbroad where government lacks
convincing testing interest in sizable subgroup of tested personnel). Accord Harmon, 878 F.2d
at 492-93 (Justice Department defined categories of testees too broadly); Hartness, 712 F.
Supp. at 991-92. Of course, this factor is not completely independent from the analysis of the
extent of the government's interest in testing. For example, a program testing a large number
of employees would tend to lend credibility to the government's interest in reducing public
risk, by a larger reduction in drug use, but would also increase the intrusiveness of the antece-
dent search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)
(searching all airline's passenger luggage reinforced legitimate interest in eliminating "enor-
mous dangers to life and property from terrorists, ordinary criminals or the demented").
258. See, e.g., Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 n.2 (samples may be tested only for specified
drugs and testing for any other substances is prohibited).
259. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 ("Further, breath tests reveal the level of alcohol in the
employee's bloodstream and nothing more.") (emphasis added).
260. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
261. Thus, even a hypothetical testing plan without any physical interference with the
testee, under perfect procedural conditions, and for only the most discrete range of illicit sub-
stances would still place some weight on the individual's side of the balance if, for example,
automatic discharge from employment followed a positive result. Of course, this niggling in-
terest would be outweighed by the government interest in nearly all circumstances. Another
hypothetical demonstrates the existence and importance of the post-test seizure. Postulate a
brutally invasive testing procedure (e.g., public and forceful) for a huge range of substances,
under sloppy procedures. As invasive as this program would be, clearly it would offend the
fourth amendment somewhat less if a fully enforceable guarantee of no repercussions for a
positive result were offered to all testees. Compare Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast
Guard, Nos. 88-1519, 88-3429 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1989) (LEXIS-15409, Genfed library, Dist file)
("Clearly, none of the [previous drug testing] cases... presents a situation in which an individ-
ual's avoidance of an invasive procedure renders him entirely ineligible from practicing his
trade or earning a livelihood, as is arguably the case here.") with Alverado v. Washington Pub.
Power Supply, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 441, 759 P.2d 427, 436 (1988) ("The only consequence of a
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onmentfollowing the drug test.2 62 Factors considered in evaluating this
type of seizure include chain-of-custody procedures, reliability and reve-
lation of secondary information (which could restrict post-test activities
of non-drug users),263 the confidentiality provisions, 2" the extent and
quality of counseling for those testing positive, and the extent of the pun-
ishment for a positive test.265 This basket of factors can tell the court
how the testing program affects the testee's post-search liberty.
After evaluating the substantive content of the physical and post-
test searches and seizures, a court aggregates the total individual interest
and then discounts the total individual interest by the extent to which the
testee's "objectively reasonable expectation of privacy" is reduced by the
regulation of the particular employment context.26 6 In doctrinal terms,
positive test is that a prospective employee will not be considered for employment for 6
months."), cer. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
262. Courts have loudly disapproved of the use of drug testing as grounds for criminal
prosecution. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 & n.5 (leaving open possibility of "as-applied"
challenge to statutory scheme if use as "pretext" for prosecution); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1390 (noting that use by prosecutor is not provided); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist.,
844 F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988) (little likelihood of prosecution); Alverado, 111 Wash. 2d at
441, 759 P.2d at 436 ("results are used only for the purpose of determining a prospective
employee's fitness for duty... [and will not leave a] permanent 'stain' on an applicant's rec-
ord"). Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2487
(1989) (noting that employer's use of drug test for "disciplinary" purposes could transform
program into labor agreement).
It is worth recognizing that the "post-test" period is chronologically the same as the "pre-
test" period for long-term employees in ongoing drug-testing programs. This fact diminishes
the conceptual boundaries between the two searches, but should not be fatal to the usefulness
of the distinction because the focus of this analysis is on how the searches affect the testee, not
when the searches occur. Also, the timing and effect of the searches seem independent (.e,
depending on the case, the pre-test or post-test search aspects will be the most offensive).
263. Note that the reliability of a chain-of-custody inquiry also might affect the extent to
which a testee will refrain from activity in which he would otherwise engage "but for" the
testing-the essence of the antecedent search.
264. The confidentiality provisions, to be entirely non-invasive, must allow the testee to
prohibit dissemination of the results beyond those individuals making employment decisions
affecting the testee. Cf Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 n.2.
("Finally, an employee need not disclose personal medical information ... unless his test result
is positive, and even then... [only] to a licensed physician."); Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697, 707 (10th Cir. 1989) (Amoco's attempt to unilat-
erally institute testing program inadequate because despite "Amoco's assurances of confidenti-
ality, employee privacy remains threatened" because of community prejudice against drug and
alcohol use).
265. Counseling has been made a part of the Health and Human Services guidelines. Fit-
ness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,473 (1989) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 2,
26).
266. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418-19. The Court wrote:
More importantly, the expectations of privacy of... [testees] are diminished by
reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively ....
We do not suggest, of course, that the interest in bodily security enjoyed by
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this is usually cast as "the administrative search exception. ' 267 In quan-
tifying the discount factor, courts consider the history of regulation268 in
the testee's work environment, the extent to which the regulation is di-
rected toward human, as opposed to non-human elements, and the
testee's advance notice of the regulation.269
those employed in a regulated industry must always be considered minimal. Here,
however, the covered employees have long been a principal focus of regulatory
concern.
Id See also Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393 ("[lIt is plain that certain forms of public employ-
ment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches."); Gov-
ernment Employees, 885 F.2d at 893 (background checks substantially reduce reasonable
privacy expectations); but see Cheney, 884 F.2d at 612-13 (civilian army guards "possess undi-
minished privacy expectations").
267. Indeed, some courts have let this rhetorical device enchant them to the point of up-
holding testing schemes without much more than a syllogistic reference to the "administrative
search exception." See, ag., Rushton, 844 F.2d at 566 (fact that employees work for nuclear
station places their case "squarely within the administrative search exception"); Alverado, 111
Wash. 2d at 435, 759 P.2d at 433 ("Given the pervasive regulations... of the nuclear power
industry, we find the administrative search exception to be appropriate.. . ."). The Supreme
Court has rebuked these courts by carefully examining the policy values underlying the admin-
istrative search rhetoric, and by refusing to engage in principled balancing. See Skinner, 109 S.
Ct. at 1418 (employees of pervasively regulated industries have diminished expectation of pri-
vacy); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-94 (employees of certain types of public employers should
reasonably have diminished privacy expectations).
Since the Court has noted its preference for balancing over the old-fashioned syllogism,
this approach is of doubtful validity. But see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1981)
("Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a 'closely regulated' industry has a
reduced expectation of privacy, the [fourth amendment requirements] ... and standards of
reasonableness for a government search are satisfied.").
268. Traditionally, a longer history of invasive regulations has been viewed as making cur-
rent or new regulations seem more reasonable and less pretextual, on the theory that the regu-
lated individuals' expectations of privacy have been adjusted downward. See Skinner, 109 S.
Ct. at 1418-19; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393; Government Employees, 855 F.2d at 893. A few
voices have questioned whether the long-term existence of regulation makes further regulation
any more reasonable. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) ("[I]f the length of
regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur .... [N]ew or emerging indus-
tries, including ones such as nuclear power . . . could never be subject to warrantless
searches."); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959), rev'd, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 188-89
(1955) (this element deserves little if any weight because well-established practices frequently
are eventually disapproved).
269. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 (employees are traditional regulatory focus); Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. at 1393-94 (customs agents expect probes into factors affecting judgment and dexter-
ity); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Costello, No. 88-8511 (LEXIS-3664, Genfed
library, Dist file) (rely on administrative search cases for policy of testing); Transportation
Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, Nos. 88-1519, 88-3429 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 1989) (LEXIS-
15409, Genfed library, Dist file) (maritime worker's privacy interests are reduced because of
pre-existing "widespread employment practices in the maritime industry and [because] the
industry is already heavily regulated"); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721
F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (distinguishing random drug tests for all motorists because "[t]he
occasional motorist does not.. . choose a particular field of work when he takes to the road
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At this point, the reviewing court has concluded the individual in-
terest portion of the core balancing test. In essence, the weight of the
three individual seizures are aggregated and then discounted by the ex-
tent to which the tested employees lack a reasonable privacy expectation.
Armed with this rigorous measure of the individual interest, the review-
ing court turns to balancing it against the government's case.
2. The governmental interest in the core balance
It is utterly undisputed that courts may weigh the government's in-
terest in protecting public safety when passing on the constitutionality of
drug testing.27 Courts have been loathe to delve deeply 271 into the
meaning of "public safety," even though it is usually the focal point
27 2 of
drug-testing cases. However, a few general principles become evident
through the usual rhetorical haze. The public safety interest is treated as
a function of the extent to which the drug testing program under consid-
eration will reduce on-the-job impairment due to the use of drugs,2 73 and
the extent to which this reduction in the use of drugs at work will reduce
and his expectations of privacy would not be reduced by doing so"). See also Dunn, 880 F.2d
at 1191 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), for proposition that prisoners have no
legitimate expectations of privacy in prison); Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 993 (typical govern-
ment workers have "undiminished expectations of privacy with respect to their elimination
functions").
270. Consideration of the public safety interest is also consistent with either dominant phil-
osophical school. Utilitarians would be willing to consider virtually any interest for the good
of society at large. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text. The neo-Kantian philoso-
phy counsels that safety of the individual is a prerequisite to liberty and happiness. See supra
notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
271. Courts have not attempted to quantify the risks associated with a particular course of
action or non-action. Modern techniques such as probabilistic risk assessment remain untap-
ped. While it is quite understandable, and arguably even desirable, to take this approach in
decisions reviewing run-of-the-mill administrative or legislative decisions, some increased rigor
seems a reasonable goal where significant constitutional rights are at stake.
272. Public safety is the "focal point" in the sense that, as the procedures involved in taking
and analyzing blood or urine samples have become increasingly rational and well-analyzed,
they likewise have become correspondingly less interesting and powerful in sorting the consti-
tutionally proper testing programs from the improper.
273. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407-21; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394-96 & n.3; Har-
mon, 878 F.2d at 487 ("Nor is it necessary that a documented drug problem exist within the
particular workplace at issue."); Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1372 (rejecting need for study show-
ing drug abuse problem in population to be tested); but see Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 991
(substantial "generalized" suspicion is necessary prerequisite).
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some pre-existing "safety risk ' 27 4 to the public. 275 Some showing in each
category-reduction of on-the-job impairment and reduction of the
safety risk to the public-is necessary. Unless the program could plausi-
bly reduce drug use and, by reducing use, cut risk to the public, the pro-
gram would be a logical nullity with respect to safety improvement. 6
However, a very strong showing of either factor can off set a very weak
showing of the other.277
The extent to which the testing policy reduces drug use is the better
developed of these two general inquiries. The inquiry boils down to mea-
274. This formulation is similar to, although not co-extensive with, Justice Scalia's elocu-
tion in his Von Raab dissent. Justice Scalia wrote: "I joined the Court's opinion [in Skinner]
because the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employ-
ees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a
reasonable means of protecting society." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The analysis posited here as a synthesis of current law allows more leeway in demonstrating
"frequency of drug and alcohol use" and is less demanding of "grave harm," although proba-
bly equally demanding in the connection between use and harm.
275. See, eg., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407 (blood testing "designed not only to discern im-
pairment but to deter it"); Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393 ("public interest demands effective
measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs");
Government Employees, 885 F.2d at 891 ("Ensuring that these employees-whose executive
assigned duties are so intimately related to the prevention of public harm-are certifiably drug-
free is, in our view, a reasonable precaution against the occurrence of the feared harm.");
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Costello, No. 88-8511 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 1989)
(LEXIS-3664, Genfed library, Dist file) ("The Court [in Skinner] also held that the urinalysis
was a reasonable search... in view of [the railroad workers'] positions in which the public
entrusts its safety ... "); Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1373 ("motor vehicle operators... [suffer-
ing] 'even momentary lapse of attention' could [cause public] harm") (citation omitted).
276. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394-95 (declining to hold that even where no drug use
exists, testing could have legitimate public safety purpose, and instead presuming, from general
societal statistics, that some drug use exists); see also Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 991 (observing
that Von Raab and Skinner suggest the need for "substantial generalized suspicion" of drug
use). The need for a showing on both prongs can be demonstrated quantitatively as X times Y
= R, where X = the extent of drug use in the tested population, Y = the public safety risk
generated by an impaired individual in the regulated activity, and R = the quantum of risk to
society. If either X or Y is zero, R must automatically be zero as well. But see Cheney, 884
F.2d at 610 (quoting with approval Judge Friendly's dictum that "[w]hen the risk is the jeop-
ardy of hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property... th[at] danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness").
277. See, eg., Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393 (drug testing upheld despite government's reli-
ance only on general anecdotes as proof of drug use because of "disastrous" consequences of
even "momentary lapse" of judgment); id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (where no specific
showing of drug use in regulated industry exists, "catastrophic" and immediate public risk are
prerequisites to valid testing program); Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1373 (upholding testing of
motor vehicle operators where "[a]lthough the harm might well not be as enormous as the
Skinner situation, it would be immediate"). See also Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 834-35 (drug
testing upheld absent overwhelming risk because "[t]he public safety rationale adopted in Von
Raab and Skinner focused on the immediacy of the threat... [that] the employee himself will
have no chance to recognize and rectify his mistake"). Such judicial flexibility, of course, is the
hallmark of an effective balancing test. McFadden, supra note 248, at 622.
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suring how the program will detect278 and deter, and thereby diminish
the quantum of on-the-job impairment.27 9 The cases establish that either
detection or deterrence, but not necessarily both, need be furthered by
the testing program to render it capable of reducing on-the-job impair-
ment.280 This showing may be satisfied by either meaningful statistics on
the general population, which are widely available, or by less-meaningful,
statistically insignificant and even anecdotal evidence targeted at the test
population.281
278. The previously divisive issue of whether drug testing must primarily reveal on-the-job
intoxication has been resolved by the courts with two thrusts. See Note, Constitutional Law:
The Fourth Amendment And Drug Testing In The Workplace, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
762, 765 (1987).
First, courts have defined "on-the-job impairment" to include the "hangover" effects of
drug use. See, eg., Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ohio 1989) ("the effects of
illicit drugs upon physical and mental performance last for a long time, more than just a few
hours, even though the user may not be conscious that he is impaired"); Alverado, 111 Wash.
2d at 436, 759 P.2d at 433-34 ("The lingering effects of drug abuse can impair one's physical
and mental capacity.. . ."). Second, the previous emphasis on on-the-job detection has been
replaced by heavier emphasis on two types of deterrence, the first type being the traditional
notion of deterring drug use by employees and the second type seeking to deter drug users
from engaging in the regulated activity. This distinction may have some import for the fitness-
for-duty rules. One court has gone so far as to say that to require drug testing to reveal on-the-
job impairment "would be tantamount to holding urinalysis testing unreasonableperse." Che-
ney, 884 F.2d at 609-10.
279. Deterrence of drug use has never been challenged conceptually, and the Court's recent
decisions do not purport to do so. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1419 ('the... regulations supply an effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-
sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in the first place"). See also
Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1371 ("drug testing also serves as a deterrent to further drug use").
The new deterrence goal implicitly assumes that the testee will continue to use drugs despite
the presence of testing, so the program instead aims at being sufficiently invasive to keep the
testee out of the regulated activity entirely. In Von Raab, the Court supported this policy
writing, "In light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend
the promotion of drug users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdic-
tion of controlled substances, the Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such
promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395 (emphasis added).
This theory, for which the Court offered no precedent, substantially expands the intru-
siveness of any particular program by exaggerating the impact of not only the first search, but
also the post-test restrictions, such as the inability to engage in one's desired trade.
280. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 (court acknowledges flaws in test's ability to
detect drug use, but emphasizes its ability to deter drug use). Of course, some evidence of drug
use must exist in the tested population, since otherwise on-the-job impairment could not be
reduced. Again, this is a trivial mathematical or logical proposition.
281. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395 (drug testing upheld despite evidence indicating
virtual absence of drug use in tested population, because "[t]here is little reason to believe that
American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social problem"). The current general
trend is in accord and nearly establishes an irrebuttable presumption of drug use, although it is
unclear whether the presumption will hold against conflicting statistics, as it did in Von Raab,
rather than the absence of any statistics at all. See, e.g., Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1372
("Although Justice Scalia's eloquent Von Raab dissent argued that the lack of a drug culture
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The second major subpart of the "public safety" interest is the
program's reduction in the total quantum of risk faced by the public
from the testee's activities. In other words, it is the extent to which the
previously aggregated quantum of on-the-job drug use reduction,
whether through deterrence or detection has the potential to actually
promote public safety by avoiding injuries and deaths.28 2 This inquiry
necessitates an activity-by-activity and, occasionally, an individual-by-in-
dividual analysis.28 3 Courts, of course, are extremely reluctant to involve
themselves in such messy detail, particularly where they are scrutinizing
a federal agency. 284 Nonetheless, the cases now demand a two-pronged
examination when calculating the total risk faced by the public from the
tested individual's activities.
First, the court must ask to what extent the testee's industry gener-
ates scenarios of public risk.28 5 Second, the court must ask what role the
testee plays in the creation of that public risk.28 6 Combined, these two
rendered the testing plan unconstitutional, his view did not command a majority of the Court
.... "). See also Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407 n. 1 (relying on decade-old study of alcohol use by
railway employees); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 487 ("Nor is it necessary that a documented drug
problem exist within the particular workplace at issue."); Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 834 ("Nor is
it necessary that a documented drug problem exist within the particular workplace at issue.").
But see Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 991 ("[W]hile Skinner and Von Raab abandoned any require-
ment for particularized, individualized suspicion as a predicate for random testing, the...
opinions require substantial generalized suspicion."). Cf Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1522
(clearly influenced by "escalating use" of drugs and "a decrease in selling price").
282. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text. Public risk reduction is a key compo-
nent of any philosophically acceptable drug testing scheme.
283. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 496 (considering separately groups of prosecutors in criminal
cases, employees with access to grand jury proceedings, and personnel holding top secret na-
tional security clearances); Government Employees, 885 F.2d at 891-93 (considering separately
electronic technicians, aviation safety inspectors, civil aviation security specialists, aircraft
mechanics and motor vehicle operators).
284. The Court in Skinner wrote, "At bottom, respondents' insistence on less drastic alter-
natives would require us to second-guess the reasonable conclusions drawn by the FRA after
years of investigation and study. This we decline to do." 109 S. Ct. at 1419 n.9; see also
Cheney, 884 F.2d at 611 ("the Army ... is, in light of its experience from fifteen years of
testing its military personnel, better able than we to assess the efficacy of urinalysis testing").
285. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (railroad industry involves "surpassing" risk);
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393 (Customs Service agent's activities involve potentially "disas-
trous" consequences, including slip-ups by gun-toting agents); Cheney, 884 F.2d at 612 (mili-
tary guards involved in duties with potentially "catastrophic consequences" with potential for
"nightmare scenarios"); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491 (not raising public safety concerns "compa-
rable" to those in Skinner and Von Raab). Thus, the focus is first on the range of scenarios
which could result in harm to the public-no matter how unlikely their occurrence may be,
such as a "motor vehicle... run[ning] into a school bus carrying 312 diplomats, caus[ing] an
international incident and ... a war." Skinner, 885 F.2d at 892. The second part of this test
adjusts for the probability of such a scenario occurring by focusing on the attenuation of the
drug-influenced employee from the particular scenario under consideration.
286. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93. This factor adjusts for the likelihood of a particular
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factors reveal the extent to which an impaired worker threatens public
safety. Once again, some showing by the testing agency on both points is
necessary. If the tested individual and his industry have no plausible
public safety role,287 then the regulation will not reduce the public risk
quantum. Likewise, if the chain of action leading to the increased public
risk is too attenuated or loosely-coupled, testing cannot improve
safety.
288
IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE: THE NEO-KANTIAN CoRE BALANCE
Both the utilitarian and rights-based courts would start by analyzing
the invasiveness of the fitness-for-duty rules under a single balancing
standard, examining all of the antecedent, physical, and post-test
"searches and seizures" engendered in the rules, discounting these by
reduced privacy expectations, and then balancing them against the gov-
ernment's public safety interest. Their divergence comes later in the
analysis. This Article need not belabor any distinctions between the two,
because the core balancing is the same.
The fitness-for-duty rules tread heavily on antecedent individual lib-
erty. Most obviously, the urinalysis is random and conducted at a high
rate.289 The United States Supreme Court has yet to examine the consti-
risk scenario actually evolving from an impaired employee's actions. Professor Perrow of Yale
University has aptly referred to this concept as "coupling"-the extent to which the risk-
producing system, in which the impaired individuals function, permits intervention between
the links in the risk scenario. The fewer the opportunities for intervention, the "tighter" the
risk system is said to be coupled. C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-
RISK TECHNOLOGIES 94-96 (1984) (arguing that redundancies in certain systems may increase,
rather than reduce, tightness of coupling). The less tight the links, the less effective a testing
program will prove in reducing risk to the public, given a fixed total industry risk. See also
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 ("momentary lapse" of attention sufficient to cause great injury);
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393; Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196 (emphasizing "transmissibility" of
AIDS virus as justifying prison HIV testing); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491 ("The public safety
rationale adopted in Von Raab and Skinner focused on the immediacy of the threat .... [A]
single slip-up . . . may have irremediable consequences; the employee himself will have no
chance to recognize and rectify his mistake .... ); Winkle, 715 F. Supp. at 197. But see
Government Employees, 885 F.2d at 892 (approving testing of mechanics despite review of
work by inspectors) (citations omitted); Rushton, 844 F.2d at 565 (approving drug testing of
nuclear power plant operators over first amendment objection even where plant "was designed
to withstand an impaired operator").
287. For example, it would be difficult to construct a scenario where a federal government
employee engaged in wildlife research, alone on an island off Antarctica, could pose a public
safety risk sufficient to establish a government interest in drug testing, even if the employee was
intimately involved with every aspect of activity on that island.
288. See, e.g., Cheney, 884 F.2d at 611-12 (court refused to rule on reasonableness of ran-
dom drug testing of civilians occupying "[c]hemical and nuclear surety positions" because
record did not reveal extent to which these employees created public safety risk).
289. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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tutionality of random testing, but lower courts have almost unanimously
acknowledged the gravity of random testing. 90 Other non-random test-
ing programs, however, could be less intrusive. For example, under a
calendar-year testing program, an employee tested in April cannot be
tested again that year, and further antecedent restrictions for that year
are thereby reduced.
The fundamentally intrusive aspect of the antecedent seizure under
the fitness-for-duty rules is its dragnet approach. No court has suggested
that hundreds of thousands of employees can be dealt with as a block.29'
In fact, the leading cases on this point have been fought over far fewer
tested employees-and in one case as few as nine.292 Although an ap-
plied challenge brought by a group of operators or security guards may
leave a different impression, any court will be sincerely troubled by the
breadth of a testing program lumping file clerks with machine-gun-
equipped guards.293 As an adjunct to the scope problem, the rate of test-
ing (100%) is noticeably higher than the twelve percent and fifty percent
rates adopted in other cases.2 94 The greater number of searches further
exacerbates the extent of the antecedent search and seizure.
The NRC rules require testing for a large number of drugs and the
cut-off levels are rather low.2 95 In addition, the NRC licensees retain
discretion under the rules to increase the number of tested substances,
and to reduce the cut-off levels.2 96 Arguably, these powers diminish the
independence of the testing process from non-neutral employer manipu-
lation. The ameliorating factors for the antecedent test search rest on the
290. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, No. 88-8511 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
1989) (LEXIS-3664, Genfed library, Dist file); Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C.
1989).
291. Compare Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 989 (as few as 2360 workers involved) with Na-
tional Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approximately
9000 civilians to be tested), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990).
292. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-74 (D.D.C.
1989) (considering individually "nine motor vehicle operators who would be subject to urinal-
ysis under the Department of Education Plan").
293. This does not suggest that some lumping is improper; Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n would be directly contrary to any such assertion. 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414-18 (1989).
However, where the benefits are outweighed by the extent to which any definable subgroup is
prejudiced by lumping with other subgroups, the lumping is too broad.
294. Compare Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, No. 88-3429 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 18, 1989) (LEXIS-15409, Genfed library, Dist file) (50% annual testing rate for Coast
Guard) with Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1363 (12% annual testing rate for Department of Educa-
tion employees).
295. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,504 (1989) (to be codified at 10
C.F.R. pts. 2, 26) (stating drugs tested for and their cut-off levels).
296. Id.
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use of Health and Human Services-based procedures to ensure reliability
and accuracy of the sampling techniques, which courts and commenta-
tors have greeted enthusiastically.
297
In contrast to the pre-test restrictions, neither the test seizure nor
the post-test seizures stand out as particularly invasive. The tests them-
selves will be made during the workday when the tested employee's time
is not his own, and the physical conditions of the testing are patterned
after the well-considered Health and Human Services standards.298 Test
results are largely confidential, although there is the troubling opportu-
nity for law enforcement officials, acting with a court order, to obtain the
test results. 299 The penalties for a positive test are significant, but are
graduated to reflect the severity of the impairment problem detected. 300
Given the virtually unparalleled numbers to be drawn into the dragnet 30 1
and the random character of testing,30 2 the most significant "search and
seizure" posed by the rules results from the restrictions workers will
likely place on individual activities prior to the testing.
If the tremendous breadth of the fitness-for-duty rules sounds like a
ticking bomb to a reviewing court, the traditional and comprehensive
regulation of the nuclear industry may be the defusing mechanism. Nu-
clear plant workers' expectation of privacy is reduced by the nature of
the industry in which they work.30 3 To the extent that the distinction
between pervasive regulation of the industry and pervasive regulation of
the industry's employees is valid, it does not control the fitness-for-duty
rules. One court has stated that:
a [nuclear plant] licensee ... is subject to a pervasive and com-
prehensive regulatory scheme. The NRC requires [a nuclear
plant] to search each individual entering .... Each hand-car-
ried and delivered package is searched. Any vehicle seeking en-
trance to [a nuclear plant] is searched .... After 2n individual
is admitted entrance, surveillance continues through the use of
closed circuit television, micro-wave transmission, and personal
observation. 3°
Importantly, individual nuclear plant workers have been targets of
297. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
298. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,504.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 24,476.
301. Id. at 24,471.
302. Id. at 24,472-73.
303. See supra note 222 for a discussion addressing administrative search exception.
304. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1523-25 (D. Neb. 1987),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
June 1990] 1199
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1153
regulation since the earliest days of the industry,3 °s and as early as 1982
the NRC first warned of possible implementation of drug testing.
30 6
Hence, the notion of legitimate governmental interference with the testee
must be accounted for in striking the correct balance.30 7
The public safety interest served by the fitness-for-duty rules is the
other side of the core neo-Kantian balancing test. The NRC must meet
the burden of showing that its interests are greater than negligible, be-
cause the individual interests threatened by the fitness-for-duty rules are
also greater than negligible. The public safety interest is the interest in
the marginal decrease in drug usage among the tested population, from
the level in a system not employing random urinalysis, and the reduction
of the aggregate safety risk which the general public is believed to face.
3 0 8
The first prong of this inquiry into public safety demands both a
showing that drug usage exists in the nuclear power plant worker popu-
lation, and that the fitness-for-duty rules would either deter or detect
impaired employees, who would not otherwise be detected. Sufficient an-
ecdotal evidence exists to warrant a finding that while on duty some nu-
clear plant employees use the drugs for which the fitness-for-duty
program tests.30 9 Anecdotal evidence of drug use at the Sequoyah and
Seabrook stations would be sufficient to establish this point under the
standard of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association310 and Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab3 1
1 and their progeny.3 12
305. Id. at 1524-25 (individuals subject to pat down searches for firearms and explosives).
The current NRC regulations governing nuclear operations are rife with concern for individual
activities. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 25 (1989) (access authorization for personnel); id. § 34
(licenses for radiological safety activities).
306. See supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text.
307. However, just as evidence is presented here to challenge the conventional wisdom that
reducing drug use by plant employees will greatly improve public safety, see infra notes 323-25
and accompanying text, evidence is presented to challenge the conventional wisdom that there
has been an historical pattern of targeting nuclear regulations at the worker. NRC regulation,
for example, has until very recently been weighted heavily toward hardware issues rather than
personnel. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The NRC's decision in 1986 to retreat
from comprehensive drug testing regulations in favor of programs developed by the individual
utilities could supercede the 1982 notice of the NRC's intention to become more active in this
area. Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 51 Fed. Reg.
27,872 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50). Still, the pages of NRC regulations going
directly to the human factors of atomic energy probably belie the revisionist history to the
contrary.
308. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
309. Personnel with Unescorted Access to Protected Areas: Fitness-for-Duty, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,980 (1982) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (citing 1 drug-related incident in 1979, 5 in
1980 and 12 in 1981).
310. 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1419 (1989).
311. 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1989).
312. See Smith v. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085, 1086-88 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (Tennessee Valley
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More systematic statistical indicators are probably also available, and the
NRC's rulemaking notice cites statistics gathered by the Commission.313
Nonetheless, the fitness-for-duty rules are not testing a population
with an unusually significant problem. Plant operators, particularly, are
highly trained NRC-licensed specialists whose skills are in high demand.
In fact, operators recently have been targets of bidding wars among the
nuclear utilities, resulting in long-term contracts at high salaries.314
Commentators have noted that nuclear power-block workers as a whole
probably have demographic characteristics differing sharply from groups
previously subject to intensive random urinalysis testing, such as naval or
army personnel.315 These differences probably render the nuclear plant
employees less susceptible to drug use. 316  The available non-anecdotal
evidence also supports the hypothesis that the fitness-for-duty-tested pop-
ulation has a lower incidence of drug use than the population at large.317
So, while the NRC has enough evidence of drug use to go forward with
its showing, it probably has little to spare.
Any reduction in drug consumption within the nuclear power
blocks will come either through detection of impairment or through de-
terrence of future impairment. The NRC has virtually conceded that the
Authority plant), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988); N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 1, at 29,
col. 6 (discussing alleged "drug and alcohol abuse among workers" at Seabrook nuclear power
plant). A systematic study found very little evidence of drug use among TVA employees. See
Laurent, Report Finds Random Drug Testing Unreliable, Costly, Federal Times, July 7, 1986,
at 3. Again, the key is that the available evidence finds some drug use-a finding sufficient to
trigger the balancing test. Another study found that drug use among nuclear power plant
control room operators may contribute to certain pre-existing risks in nuclear power. See
Grand Jury Cites Drug Use at Nuclear Plant, 24 Gov't. Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1177, at
1148 (Aug. 25, 1986).
Also, one House committee report claimed that former NRC Chairman Lando Zech, Jr.
stated that 61 of the nation's nuclear plants reported at least a single incident of drug or
alcohol abuse. See SUBCOMM. ON GENERAL OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., lST SEsS., NRC COZI-
NESS WITH INDUSTRY 5 (Comm. Print 1987).
313. Under the standard established in Von Raab and Skinner, the more comprehensive
empirical information collected by the NRC surely would qualify, even without the anecdotes,
even though the empirical evidence indicates that power-block usage is relatively rare. Fitness-
for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,469.
314. See Bidding War for Nuclear Operators, Energy Daily, Sept. 27, 1989, at 2, col. 1.
315. NUREG-1354, supra note 40, at 79.
316. Id. at 7-9 ("Commentators thought that it was not fair to compare the military, where
a proven drug problem existed prior to the implementation of testing, to the nuclear industry
.... Substantial differences exist between military personnel and commercial nuclear power
plant workers in terms of age, family responsibilities, and stability of workforce."). Ulti-
mately, the NRC accepted these arguments and reduced the proposed rate of testing from
300% to 100% per year. Id.
317. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,469.
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fitness-for-duty rules do not ferret out current impairment.3' 8 However,
the detection of past impairment can logically lead to the reduction of
current and future impairment, particularly given the addictive nature of
many of the substances for which the NRC tests. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has largely settled for indirect detection of current
impairment.319
As for the deterrence goal, random drug testing certainly will deter
on-the-job use, particularly by the occasional employee-user unlikely to
be detected by traditional, less invasive techniques. Also, the testing rate
selected by the NRC-100% of the tested population per annum
32 - -
will ensure that fear of the tests will be widespread among users. Fear, of
course, is the calling card of effective deterrence.
The fitness-for-duty program will therefore serve the government by
reducing on-the-job drug impairment of nuclear power plant workers,
even if the program does not, strictly speaking, cull contemporaneous
use, and even if drug use at most plants is not very widespread. The
paramount lesson of Von Raab is that anecdotal evidence is sufficient to
avoid automatic rejection of the program's constitutionality and requires
further examination of the public safety benefits derived from the reduc-
tion in employee impairment.
Thus, the question becomes whether the reduction in employee drug
usage encouraged by the fitness-for-duty rules actually reduces public
safety risks. The extent of the public risk reduction is derived from two
elemental calculations: (1) the range of risks to public safety posed by
the nuclear power industry; and (2) the probability that a drug-impaired
employee will trigger or serve in a chain of events culminating in an acci-
dent.321 The first element necessarily involves relatively broad engineer-
ing (and some would say political or normative) judgments concerning
318. Ii
319. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419-20; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394-96.
320. Fitness-for-Duty Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,474. A distinct relationship probably ex-
ists between the rate of testing under a drug testing program and the extent to which it consti-
tutes an antecedent search and seizure. The fitness-for-duty rules, with their 100% annual
random testing rate, probably deter more employee impairment than would rules employing,
for example, a 10% rate. At the same time, however, the 100% program is a more invasive
antecedent search and seizure (e.g., more people will restrict private activities and more testing
mistakes will be made) than a 10% testing program. Therefore, arguments like Justice Ste-
vens' in Skinner-that drug testing is less constitutional where it is a relatively ineffective
deterrent, Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (Stevens, J., concurring)-lack vision and fail to account
for the interdependence of effective deterrence and invasiveness. By the same token, a testing
scheme like the fitness-for-duty rules should not be blindly deemed more constitutional simply
because it deters a greater degree of usage than would a less invasive program.
321. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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the risks of nuclear power. By contrast, an employees' connection with
an accident naturally involves fewer philosophical pronouncements and
more scientific method. This forms the heart of the rights-based case
against random drug testing justified on public safety grounds.322
The literature on the issue of the "safety" of nuclear power plants is
divided into two groups. The largest group consists of "mainstream"
scientists and other nuclear specialists, generally arguing that nuclear
power poses a range of public safety risks substantially less significant
than other technologies employed routinely by the public, and certainly
much less significant than current alternatives, including energy conser-
vation.323 A smaller group of scientists argue that nuclear power is
either substantially less safe than commonplace technologies or alterna-
tive methods of generating electricity, particularly if the conservation op-
tion is considered, 24 or that the comparative risks cannot effectively be
measured.325
Precedents indicate that the issue of nuclear power's risk to public
safety will be "paramount" in the court's mind and that "it goes without
saying that a nuclear release affecting plant employees or the public at
large would be disastrous. "326 It is quite unlikely that any court will
322. The literature analyzing the relative, absolute safety of nuclear power is voluminous,
and most of it is, to put it politely, highly partisan. See B. COHEN, supra note 15, at 93-103
(argument in support of nuclear power, with substantial discussion of alternative views and
sources of electricity); WORLD WATCH INST. PAPER No. 75, REASSESSING NUCLEAR
POWER: THE FALLOUT FROM CHERNOBYL 65 (1987) (opposing existing use of nuclear
power); Huber, supra note 4, at 1062 (comparing environmental hazards of full range of en-
ergy-production options, including nuclear).
323. See eg., B. COHEN, supra note 15 at 93-103. Professor Cohen's work has demon-
strated that the overwhelming majority of nuclear scientists believe nuclear power to be a
relatively benign source of electricity. Id. at 1,256. Obviously, such collective opinion is most
persuasive when limited to engineering and technical analysis comparing nuclear to the alter-
natives, and much less convincing when expanded to include philosophical analysis, since
probably not even the most vociferous nuclear advocates argue that scientists alone should
answer the question: "How safe is safe enough?" Admirably, Cohen concedes this point. Id.
at 97. Other respected professional organizations, including the American Medical Associa-
tion and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers have recently felt compelled to an-
nounce their support for nuclear power as a comparatively benign electricity-generating
technology. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, GENERAL POSITION PA-
PER ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12 (1989); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR POWER 46 (1988).
324. The "Union of Concerned Scientists World Watch Institute," and "Public Citizen"
have been among the most vocal and visible of such groups, and certainly include a significant
number of respected scientists. Their most fundamental attack, which is far beyond the pur-
view of this Article, is on the entire science of probabilistic risk assessment.
325. WORLD WATCH INST., supra note 322, at 40.
326. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1519. See also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844
F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988) (great "potential for harm ... caused by a malfunction of a
nuclear power plant").
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make the effort necessary to understand that probabilistic risk assess-
ment 27 shows that such a "disastrous" release is bizarrely unlikely, and
that nuclear power is a relatively safe and benign method of generating
electricity.3 2 However, scenarios of great public risk can always be con-
jured up, and since the purpose of this section of the Article is to cast
doubt on the prevalent assumption that broad drug testing in the nuclear
environment presents only trivial constitutional issues, the Article as-
sumes that reviewing courts take the visceral approach to nuclear
safety.
3 29
Turning to the employee's role in the range of risks posed by nuclear
power,3 ° it turns out that most employees play only an indirect, highly
attenuated role in creating any public safety risk.331 The NRC has al-
327. At least one prominent commentator on environmental risk assessment has suggested
that courts can, and therefore should, become more involved in probabilistic risk assessment.
See Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Perspective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 868,
871 (Sept. 22, 1989) ("Government agencies have no better access than the courts to reliable
information about the source and effect of our [environmental] pollutants, which is inherently
elusive."). In fact, the fundamental nature of the quasi-utilitarian balancing test may substan-
tially lessen the distinction between the role of judges and the role of agencies in risk assess-
ment. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Ultimately, I fear, this ad hoc approach to [the fourth amendment] obscures the difference
between judicial decisionmaking and... administrative policymaking."). If the balancing test
tends to eviscerate the distinction drawn by Justice Brennan, then courts certainly should feel
less reluctant to dive intb the analysis. The NRC reports satisfaction with contemporary prob-
abilistic techniques:
The applications of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in regulatory activities con-
tinued to expand in fiscal year 1988. Traditional uses ofPRA ... continued to prove
useful and important to the safety of nuclear power plants .... Major progress has
been made in the applications of PRA results and insights to licensing and inspection
activities.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1989).
328. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
329. The NRC periodically engages in probabilistic risk assessment to analyze risk scena-
rios. The process sometimes borders on lurid. See B. COHEN, supra note 15, at 62-68, 93. See
also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 15-17 (1989) (describing
latest NRC foray into severe accident probability calculations).
330. The discussion presented in this Article focuses on control room operators. Many
other tested power block employees, including file clerks and secretaries, have less significant
safety roles in plant operations. This group of nuclear plant power block employees is particu-
larly distinguishable from other human populations filling high-risk positions. The weapon-
toting plant guards, of course, may be a different matter, as case law properly focuses on the
tight coupling between their jobs and potentially serious consequences.
One commentator has suggested that control room operators should be more susceptible
to random testing than other types of nuclear employees. See Note, A Proposal for Mandatory
Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 322, 365-70 (1987) (endorsing
random testing for operators). However, the critical nature of the operators' job subjects them
to high levels of scrutiny and arguably reduces the need for random testing.
331. Studies show that with proper training, nuclear power plant personnel can help mini-
mize the hazard of an accident. See, e.g., Bertron, Meclot & Chevallon, Operator Organization
1204
DRUG TESTING AND NUCLEAR POWER
ready conceded that:
[t]he [fitness-for-duty] rule is not needed to provide adequate
protection of public health and safety under Section 182 of the
Atomic Energy Act because there is a sufficient margin of
safety inherent in the design of nuclear power reactors through
provision of redundant safety systems and automatic shut down
features. Adequate protection is further provided by the de-
fense in depth of multiple containment barriers and adherence
to the technical specifications and operating conditions in
licenses. The rule would provide additional assurance that nu-
clear workers adhere to the technical specifications and operat-
ing conditions in licenses.332
The "two-tiered" NRC backfit scheme sets up a first tier of backfits,
those required for "adequate protection of the public health and safety,"
and a second tier of proposed backfits which go beyond "adequate pro-
tection. '333 The NRC "make[s] clear that economic costs may not be
considered when action is necessary to restore a plant to the requisite
level of adequate protection or when the level of protection must be in-
creased to be considered adequate.
'334
Therefore, when it decided to conduct a backfit analysis, the NRC
effectively took the position that the fitness-for-duty rules are not neces-
sary to ensure an adequate level of public safety. Whatever the motiva-
tion, the NRC's own posture on this issue confirms the lack of tight
coupling in the nuclear risk system's human components, suggesting a
less compelling need for drug testing of all employees.335
for the Management of a Nuclear Accident in a Power Plant, 29 NUCLEAR SAFETY 115 (1988).
Professor Perrow reaches some moderately contrary conclusions, but Perrow's work focuses
mainly on the nuclear system as a whole, with heavy emphasis on hardware issues, rather than
the role of operators or other employees. See C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING
WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984). Notably, Perrow uses illustrations other than nu-
clear power plants to demonstrate tight risk system coupling. Id. at 270-71, 276-81.
332. BACKFT ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 24. A previous NRC study has indicated that
"[a]lthough the Commission... cannot quantify the reduction in risk that will occur when
fitness-for-duty programs exist at all plants, the potential for significant increases in risk, as a
result of increased rates of human error, has been clearly demonstrated." Id. at 6 (citing
BROOKHAVES NATIONAL LABORATORY, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
NUREG-1879, SENSITIVITY OF RISK PARAMETERS TO HUMAN ERRORS IN REACTOR
SAFETY STUDIES FOR A PWR (1981)).
333. Id. at 24.
334. See Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.109(a)(3)-(4) (1989). The backfit analysis requirement does not apply unless "regulatory
action is necessary to ensure ... adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."
Id. § 50.109(a)(4)(ii).
335. This does not necessarily suggest that subgroups (eg., operators and security guards)
of the thousands of employees of each site do not play a significant safety role. It merely
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"The enormous range of system redundancies ' 336 which render an
impaired operator, much less a file clerk, virtually unable to single-
handedly take action leading to a major public health threat illustrate the
NRC's position.337 It therefore seems improbable that a reviewing court
could find a significant public safety role for the vast majority of the
tested employees. 338 A nuclear power plant, much more than a criminal
detection system, air traffic control, or even the highway system, is much
better equipped to deal routinely with an impaired human element. As
Professor Cohen observed, "I often wonder why [the scare tactics]
work-when we drive on a high speed highway, on every curve we are
within a few seconds of being killed if nothing is done-that is, if the
steering wheel is not turned at the proper time."339
V. UTILITARIAN COURTSi THE APPLICABLE LIMITS
This Article has demonstrated that the individual and state interests
are roughly in balance from a rights-based perspective focusing only on
the individual and public safety.3 ° The core, rights-based analysis rebuts
previous suggestions that random drug testing in the nuclear industry is
not a close or interesting constitutional case.
suggests that even the NRC recognizes that fitness-for-duty rules are a blunt, and perhaps even
dull, safety assurance instrument.
336. See B. COHEN, supra note 15, at 49-66. Cohen discusses the large number of safeguards
which exist and which would prevent a serious accident (meltdown) from occurring. Id. Pub-
lie misperception rather than any basis in fact generates a false conception of danger. Id.
337. The NRC recently withdrew a proposed rule which would have tightened educational
standards for operators and their immediate supervisors, despite then-Commissioner Lando
Zech, Jr.'s view that the rule was "a good idea." Kaplan, NRC Backtracks Under Heavy
Industry Pressure, Legal Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 6, col. 3. If rules which would assist opera-
tors are unnecessary to protect public safety, rules which effectively punish operators in the
name of public safety are somewhat puzzling.
338. The district court in Rushton rejected this reliance on systems redundancies, but can
be distinguished without great difficulty. First, the district court's analysis was in the first
amendment context. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1516-20. Second, the court lacked the benefit of
the NRC's recent pronouncements denigrating the safety necessity of the fitness-for-duty pro-
gram. .See supra note 332 and accompanying text. Third, Rushton was decided before the
more recent cases suggesting that the public risk system must permit little or no intervention to
support drug testing.
339. B. COHEN, supra note 15, at 55.
340. This Article promised some formalism earlier, and it will be delivered now. On a scale
from 1 (weakest showing) to 10 (strongest showing), the balance might be quantified as
follows:
(total 10) Antecedent seizure 9
(total 10) Test seizure 4
(total 10) Post-test seizure 8
(total 10) Less discount for reduced expectation (9)
Total individual interest "T
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Rights-based philosophy must be careful to avoid crumbling into
mere humanistic utilitarianism and, consistent with this concern, must
seek to sharply limit those government claims which may justly be
weighed against the individual's interests. Thus, courts following this
philosophy will not consider "government interests" in: (1) promoting
the activity in which the tested workers engage, (2) increasing the pub-
lic's confidence in the activity in which the tested workers engage, or (3)
improving the efficiency of the activity to which the tested employees are
appointed.
The utilitarians, however, need not linger over such niceties, and
thus are willing to balance virtually any asserted government interest
against the threatened individual interest. Even the most doctrinaire
utilitarian courts will collapse the entire inquiry into examining the "effi-
ciency" of the testing regulations. The question posed will likely be
whether the regulations improve the general welfare. The security of the
individual is tenuous, to be sure, but devotion to the good of the whole is
never more sincere. Therefore, utilitarian-influenced judges will proba-
bly disagree with their rights-based counterparts on even moderately
close drug-testing cases.
The work for the courtrooms influenced by the utilitarian tradition
is not finished, since these judges will be asked to consider myriad other
government interests for balancing. Professor Kasimar has noted that
"many of the drug testing cases percolating in the lower courts involve
programs that were justified not by public safety needs, but by the gen-
eral need to maintain public confidence in government employees. 1,3
4
What is to be done with these and other interests? As the Supreme Court
said in another recent government workplace-search case, "[p]ublic em-
ployers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an ef-
fective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably
suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement or other
(total 10) Reduction in use impairment & deterrence
Size of problem 3
(total 10) Extent of risk 2
Potential size 5
Testee impact 2
Total public safety interest 12
In other words, in a rights-based court, the balance of competing interests would be virtu-
ally identical.
341. Constitutional Law Conference, 58 U.S.L.W. 2200, 2206 (Oct. 10, 1989). Kasimar
voiced his support for programs based on public safety risk over those based on government
employees as role models, because the latter approach has no "stopping point." Id.
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work-related misfeasance of its employees. 342
Also, the district court case of Fowler v. New York City Department
of Sanitation,343 decided before National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab3 4 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,
34
righteously ratified the legitimacy of a broader inquiry into the relative
efficiencies of the competing interests.346 The Fowler court wrote:
[A] small decrease in productivity among even a small percent-
age of public employees can lead to a massive waste of tax-
payer's [sic] money .... The National Institute on Drug Abuse
estimates the current cost of drug use by workers at $100 bil-
lion per year. It does not require much extrapolation to appre-
ciate the financial burden placed on public employers ....
[Government] has a strong financial interest in taking affirma-
tive measures designed to reduce the risk of accidents and re-
lated injuries.347
Whether these general utilitarian principles will eventually dominate in
the courts remains an open question, even after Skinner and Von Raab,
but, as Professor Kasimar notes,348 it is a real possibility.
A. The NRC Backfit Analysis
The NRC addresses most of these utilitarian general efficiency con-
cers in its statutorily mandated Backfit Analysis. 349 The NRC's Backfit
Analysis for the fitness-for-duty rules concludes that "the direct and indi-
342. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (work-related searches of employees'
offices and effects).
343. 704 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding pre-employment and follow-up
non-random testing of sanitation workers).
344. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
345. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
346. Fowler, 704 F. Supp. at 1273. The Fowler court articulated a pristinely utilitarian view
of drug testing regulations. The court said, "[ilt is not [a] responsibility for public safety,
perceptible a priori in every aspect of a job that ... [justifies testing], but rather the possible
consequences of drug-induced error. Those consequences provide the measure of the govern-
ment's interest." Id. at 1274.
347. Id. at 1275 (citations omitted).
348. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 341, at 2206.
349. See Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50.109
(1989). This section states in part:
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(4) of this section, the Commission shall require
the backfitting of a facility only when it determines ... that there is a substantial
increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect
costs of implementation for that facility are justified in view of this increased
protection.
Id. at § 50.109(a)(3).
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rect costs of implementing the new rule are justified in view of the in-
creased protection [of the public]. ' 350 Even if the Backfit Analysis is
quantitatively accurate, a dubious proposition, it is badly flawed as an
utilitarian analysis and should not be taken seriously by a reviewing
court as definitive on the utilitarian virtues of the fitness-for-duty
rules.35 1
First, the Backfit Analysis actually balances only the marginal costs
of the fitness-for-duty rules (the costs beyond those already imposed by
the various existing utility fitness-for-duty programs) against the total
benefit of the fitness-for-duty program (instead of limiting itself to the
marginal benefits beyond those already flowing from existing pro-
grams). 352 This approach is simply wrong as a matter of logic. The
NRC notes the Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear stations' 1979 annual
expenditure of $18.5 million on it's alcohol abuse program alone.353 Ad-
justing for 1990 dollars and the more than 110 reactors currently in oper-
ation, the annual cost of all the fitness-for-duty programs could approach
that of buying a brand-new small reactor.
Commentators have noted numerous less fundamental but still sub-
stantial flaws in the Backfit Analysis.3 54 No consideration is given by the
Backfit Analysis to the costs of legal challenges to the fitness-for-duty
rules. 5  These challenges will be expensive. Several commentators ar-
gued that implementation costs associated with the fitness-for-duty rules
were understated in the NOPR by as much as a factor of three.35s
There are other reasons to be wary of using the Backfit Analysis as a
350. BACKFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 24.
351. The backfit rule allows the NRC to consider only "public safety" and "common de-
fense" as government interests. 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(3) (1989). To the extent that the gov-
ernment wishes to throw broader interests into the battle on behalf of the fitness-for-duty rules,
it would be handicapped if the reviewing court adopted the Backfit Analysis framework.
352. BACKFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 8 ("In many respects these [existing] programs
compare very closely to the requirements stated in the proposed rule. As a result, the incre-
mental burden to industry... is significantly reduced."). The NRC estimated the incremental
cost of the programs to be upwards of a half-billion dollars, even while noting that all of the
licensees already have an industry-approved program in place. Id. The NRC has perhaps
understated the situation in conceding that "[i]f all of these backfit requirements were new to
industry, the cost implications of such a program would be more significant." Id.
353. Id. at 8 n.2.
354. See generally NUREG-1354 supra note 40, at 19-1 to 19-6.
355. Id. at 19-4 ("The Commission agrees that there may be some costs associated with
these legal challenges but has no basis for assessing these costs. Attention to quality controls,
the costs of which were included, should serve to minimize these legal costs."). Indeed, the
decentralized application of the fitness-for-duty rules, the provisions in the fitness-for-duty
rules allowing the utilities to set independent standards for the number of drugs tested, and the
cut-off levels suggest that multiple legal challenges may be brought.
356. Id. at 19-2.
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proxy for an overall utilitarian efficiency theory. The Backfit Analysis
explicitly and primarily considered the public safety improvement factor
as part of the core, rights-based analysis.357 Considering public safety
improvement is obviously laudable, but under the formula suggested in
this Article, public safety has already been weighed in the core rights-
based balancing.358 To ask courts to consider public safety again, this
time under the utilitarian label, would be double-counting. Also, the
Backfit Analysis does not quantify the costs of false positive results to
power block employees. 359 This flaw further reduces the Backfit Analy-
sis' value as a proxy for overall utility analysis. At a minimum, there-
fore, any utilitarian reviewing court should, if it wishes to add the general
utility argument to the government's column, make an independent and
more appropriate analysis of what the other values are.
Up to this point the Article has strained to stay within the lines of
substantive analysis, and to avoid the temptation of looking at tertiary
procedural issues. Substantive analysis reveals that: (1) the core balanc-
ing analysis of the governmental public safety interests against the indi-
vidual interests leaves no concrete conclusion; and (2) an utilitarian
reviewing court will need to do more than read a copy of the NRC's
Backfit Analysis. At this juncture an important procedural point will
face a reviewing court-the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Act).36
B. Constraints on Utilitarian Courts: The Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974
The history of nuclear regulation reveals a continuous and steady
decrease in the government's ability to promote nuclear power. The fed-
eral promotional burden today has been shifted almost entirely to the
private sector-the nuclear vendors and their utility customers. 361
Although one of the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act was to provide
for a program of assisting and fostering private research and develop-
ment of atomic energy, the Supreme Court has noted that, "[u]ntil 1954
... the use, control and ownership of nuclear technology remained a
federal monopoly. '3 62 With the 1954 amendments to the Act emphasiz-
357. See BACKFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 6 (considering the "[p]otential change in the
risk to the public from the accidental offsite release of radioactive material").
358. NUREG-1354, supra note 40, at 19-4 to 19-5.
359. BACKFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 8-20.
360. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879 (1982)).
361. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
194 (1983).
362. Id at 206.
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ing private participation, the Atomic Energy Commission shared the
promotional role with the private sector.1
63
By the late 1960s, critics of the nuclear industry were carping about
the "fundamental conflict of interest" within the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, which stood both as the promoter and the public guardian from
nuclear technology. 63 Contemporary scholarship has debunked this no-
tion of conflict by demonstrating that "regulation" to protect public
safety is conceptually the same as "promotion."36 However, without the
benefit of more recent reexamination, Congress segregated the Atomic
Energy Commission's guardian and promotional functions, through the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.366
The Act carved two new agencies out of the defunct Atomic Energy
Commission: the NRC, now responsible for the public safety aspects of
nuclear power,367 and the Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA),368 which is charged with developing all "alternative"
energy forms, including nuclear.369 Even the ERDA, however, was en-
acted with "provisions to safeguard against unwarranted priority being
given by ERDA's bosses to any single energy technology, °370 a clear sig-
nal to the agency not to push nuclear to the exclusion of other energy
technologies under its purview.
363. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3454, 3464.
The recommended legislation therefore permits the Commission to license private
industry, to possess and use special nuclear materials. The United States Govern-
ment, however, would retain title to such materials .... It is our firmly held convic-
tion that increased private participation in atomic power development, under the
terms stipulated in this proposed legislation, will measurably accelerate our progress
toward the day when economic atomic power will be a fact.
Id.
364. See generally Note, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear
Regulation: Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 899, 910-11 (1984).
365. See Huber, supra note 4, at 1009-13 ("Of course, the regulatory child of the AEC [the
NRC] still promotes nuclear power, partly through research and development on safety mat-
ters but more directly through the preemption of inconsistent state safety regulation by the
very process of granting federal licenses.") Id. at 1010.
366. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879 (1982)).
367. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a)(1) (1982). See also Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 880
F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Congress intended public safety to be a paramount concern
of the Commission.").
368. 42 U.S.C. § 5811 (1982). See generally Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources
& Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1981) ("ERDA was directed to develop all
sources of energy, including nuclear, but only 'consistent with warranted priorities.' ").
369. 42 U.S.C. § 5814(e)(2) (1982).
370. S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5470, 5471.
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Congress also intended to silence the conflict-of-interest critics:
The reorganization established by this legislation has the addi-
tional purpose of separating the regulatory functions of the
AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] from its developmental and
promotional functions-a response to growing criticism that
there is a basic conflict between the AEC's regulation of the
nuclear power industry and its development and promotion of
new technology for the industry.371
As noted, even the ERDA's powers to promote nuclear power were con-
strained.372 It was ordered to boost nuclear power only consistent with
warranted priorities.373 The Senate Report accompanying the bill ex-
plains that this was intended to placate "concern... that nuclear...
might dominate the missions and directions of the new agency. ' 374 The
government's role in active promotion of the peaceful use of the atom,
born in 1946, died in 1974.
The NRC's own charter, therefore, strictly prohibits any type of fed-
eral promotional activity. The Commission may not justify drug testing
in the way so many other governmental bodies have--on grounds of its
interest in maintaining public confidence or boosting its public image.375
While the Customs Service may perhaps rely on those rationales, 376 Con-
gress has said the NRC cannot. Presumably this prohibition applies with
extra force where the promotional activity is intended to generate bene-
fits to be captured by the nuclear industry rather than the general public.
Although this argument might be cognizable under the Administrative
Procedure Act,377 it is not under the fourth amendment. Thus, a utilita-
rian court, already inclined to consider the promotion of nuclear energy
as a legitimate government interest would not presume that the NRC's
design of fitness-for-duty rules deliberately exceeded its own grant of au-
371. Id.
372. Opponents of nuclear power, including NRC Commissioner James Asselstine, vigor-
ously insist that the separation into two agencies has been ineffective and that the NRC "be-
lieves its job is to protect the industry and not the public." WORLD WATCH INST. PAPER No.
75, REASSESSING NUCLEAR POWER: THE FALLOUT FROM CHERNOBYL 44 (1987).
373. S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5470, 5489.
374. S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5470, 5480.
375. See, eg., Costello v. City of Philadelphia, No. 88-8511 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 1989)
(LEXIS-3664, Genfed library, Dist file) (dissolving injunction against random testing of police
because "public concern and safety considerations ... [are] an adequate ground to allow"
testing). See also Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey, Local 316 v. Township of
Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
376. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1392-93 (1989).
377. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1988).
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thority from Congress.378
VI. CONCLUSION: FITNESS-FOR-DUTY RULES AND THE FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR POWER
The nuclear energy industry and America's war on drugs have been
on a collision course throughout the 1980s. The nuclear industry has
been victimized by an unfavorable political dialectic which leaves it vul-
nerable to increased costs and dwindling public support.3 79 Meanwhile,
government-sponsored drug testing has made inroads into more work-
places. If the fitness-for-duty rules are upheld, nuclear utilities will be
forced to test all employees under fitness-for-duty programs rivaled in
thoroughness only by those of the military services. With these ex-
tremely tough rules in place, the identification of many drug users is cer-
tain. These rules may lead to the perception that even stringent
regulations fail to guarantee safety. This will further undermine a bal-
anced American energy policy by making nuclear power more costly
than alternative forms of energy.380
The policy-making role is, of course, the province of the legislature
and the agencies.3 " The courts are limited to reviewing the constitution-
ality of fitness-for-duty rules.382 The greatest threat posed by these rules
is approval by the courts, without adequate consideration of the broader
safety issues of nuclear energy generation.38 3 Poorly considered approval
of the new drug-testing regulations can only stoke the popular and judi-
378. Presumably, the NRC is equally barred by Congress from "providing public confi-
dence" in the industry as it is from "promoting the industry," at least until a principled dis-
tinction between these two catch-phrases is articulated.
379. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
381. Ironically, the fitness-for-duty rules make nuclear power less financially attractive at a
time when policymakers are becoming much more earnest about crafting a balanced American
energy policy, see Maize, The Search Begins for Energy 'Consensus Blueprint" Energy Daily,
Aug. 2, 1989 at 1, col. 2, and against the backdrop of dire warnings of electrical capacity
shortages in the early 1990s. See McCaughney, Generating Shortages Threaten National Se-
curity, Energy Daily, Oct. 17, 1989 at 1, col. 2 ("The declining electric generating reserve
margins that confront the United States on the brink of the 1990s jeopardize the nation's
future .... ").
382. Presumably, review of the efficacy of the fitness-for-duty rules, without regard to their
constitutional validity, would come under either the "arbitrary or capricious" or the "substan-
tial evidence" standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Either
stapdard places a daunting burden on the fitness-for-duty challengers. See E. GELLHORN & B.
BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 415-16 (1981).
383. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing increased fears of global
warming and acid rain).
June 1990] 1213
1214 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
cial opposition to nuclear power, and further entrench the myth of im-
pending catastrophe.
All courts seem willing to start with a core neo-Kantian analysis,
pitting individual privacy interests against the government's compelling
interest in -protecting the public's safety. The NRC's fitness-for-duty
rules present a close neo-Kantian core balance. The huge scope and ran-
domness 38 4 of the new nuclear program is significantly offset by the di-
minished privacy expectations of nuclear employees.385 Yet, there is
little evidence of significant drug use in nuclear plants.386 Although cata-
strophic risk scenarios go hand-in-hand with nuclear energy, nuclear em-
ployees play a very limited role in those scenarios, a point the NRC
effectively concedes.387
For the moment, however, utilitarian influences are on the ascen-
dancy in drug-testing jurisprudence. Utilitarian courts are inclined to
consider virtually any asserted government interest. However, utilitarian
courts are constrained by the Energy Reorganization Act.388 The act
bars the NRC from regulating nuclear power in such a fashion as to
promote it. The courts therefore cannot consider the promotion of nu-
clear energy as a legitimate government interest.
Regrettably, the case for nuclear power probably will not be made.
Civil libertarians frequently interested in challenging drug-testing regula-
tions are more interested in the individual rights aspect of the dispute
and, to be frank, are not natural allies of nuclear power. Moreover, the
nuclear utilities, whether because of the conflict of interest inherent in
owning nuclear and non-nuclear production facilities, or because they
find it easier to accede than to fight another bloody backfit battle, or
because the costs of complying ultimately will come from ratepayers, not
stockholders, are also not inclined to fight.
The fitness-for-duty rules put the nuclear industry on the defensive.
Constitutional protections may be lost in the search for highly dubious
safety gains bizarrely unlikely to manifest themselves in the lifetime of
nuclear plants currently in operation. The American energy generation
will be restrained in unfortunate ways at a crucial juncture in the history
of energy policy.
384. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 228-31.
386. See supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
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